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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Data mining is the process of extracting hidden predictive information from large 
databases, it has a great potential to help governments, researchers and companies focus on 
the most significant information in their data warehouses. High quality data and effective data 
publishing are needed to gain a high impact from data mining process. However there is a 
clear need to preserve individual privacy in the released data. Privacy-preserving data 
publishing is a research topic of eliminating privacy threats. At the same time it provides 
useful information in the released data. Normally datasets include many sensitive attributes; it 
may contain static data or dynamic data. Datasets may need to publish multiple updated 
releases with different time stamps. As a concrete example, public opinions include highly 
sensitive information about an individual and may reflect a person's perspective, 
understanding, particular feelings, way of life, and desires. On one hand, public opinion is 
often collected through a central server which keeps a user profile for each participant and 
needs to publish this data for researchers to deeply analyze. On the other hand, new privacy 
concerns arise and user’s privacy can be at risk. The user’s opinion is sensitive information 
and it must be protected before and after data publishing.  Opinions are about a few issues, 
while the total number of issues is huge. In this case we will deal with multiple sensitive 
attributes in order to develop an efficient model. Furthermore, opinions are gathered and 
published periodically, correlations between sensitive attributes in different releases may 
occur. Thus the anonymization technique must care about previous releases as well as the 
dependencies between released issues.   
This dissertation identifies a new privacy problem of public opinions. In addition it 
presents two probabilistic anonymization algorithms based on the concepts of k-anonymity 
[1, 2] and -diversity [3, 4] to solve the problem of both publishing datasets with multiple 
sensitive attributes and publishing dynamic datasets. Proposed algorithms provide a heuristic 
solution for multidimensional quasi-identifier and multidimensional sensitive attributes using 
probabilistic -diverse definition. Experimental results show that these algorithms clearly 
outperform the existing algorithms in term of anonymization accuracy. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
Veri madenciliği tahmin edilebilir gizli bilgiyi büyük very tabanlarından çıkarma 
işlemidir. Devletlere, araştırmacılara ve şirketlere veri ambarlarındaki en önemli bilgilere 
odaklanmaları konusunda yardım etmek gibi büyük bir potansiyele sahiptir. Veri 
madenciliğinin yüksek bir etki  sağlayabilmesi için yüksek kaliteli veriye ve etkin veri 
yayıncılığına ihtiyaç duyulur. Buna karşın, yayınlanan veri için kişisel mahremiyetin 
korunması da açık bir ihtiyaçtır. "Mahremiyet koruyan veri yayıncılığı" yayınlanan veriden 
faydalı bilgiler elde ederken mahremiyet ihlaline yol açabilecek tehlikeleri önlemenin 
yollarını inceleyen bir araştırma konusudur. Normalde veri kümelerinin birçok hassas özelliği 
vardır; durağan veya devingen veri içerebilirler. Veri kümeleri farklı zaman damgalı birden 
çok güncellenmiş sürümü yayınlamak durumunda kalabilirler. Somut bir örnek vermek 
gerekirse, kamuoyu bireyler hakkında yüksek hassaslıkta bilgi içerir ve bireylerin görüş 
açısını, anlayışını, duygularını, yaşam tarzını ver arzularını yansıtabilir. Bir yandan, kamuoyu 
her katılımcı için bir kullanıcı profilinin tutulduğu merkezi sunucular tarafından toplanır. Öte 
yandan, yeni mahremiyet sorunları ortaya çıkar ve kullanıcının mahremiyeti tehlikeye 
girebilir. Kullanıcının görüşü hassas bir bilgidir ve veri yayıncılığından önce ve sonra da 
korunmalıdır. Görüşler genelde birkaç mevzu hakkındadır ama, toplam mevzu sayısı çok 
fazladır. Bu durumda, etkili bir model geliştirebilmek için birden çok hassas özellikle başı 
çıkılmalıdır. İlaveten, görüşler belirli aralıklarla toplanıp yayınlandığında,hassas özelliklerin 
farklı sürümleri arasında ilişkiler ortaya çıkabilir. Bu yüzden, isimsezleştirme yöntemi 
yayınlanan konular arasındaki bağımlılığı incelediği gibi önceki sürümleri de göz önüne 
almalıdır.  
Bu tez kamuoyu hakkında yeni bir mahremiyet problemi tespit ediyor. Bunun 
yanında, devingen veri kümelerini yayınlamak ve birden çok hassas özellik içeren veri 
kümelerini yayınlamak problemlerini çözmek için k-isimsizleştirme [1, 2] ve ell-çeşitlilik [3, 
4]  kavramlarına dayanan iki olasılıksal algoritma sunuyor. Önerilen algoritmalar, olasılıksal 
ell-çeşitlilik tanımını kullanarak  çok boyutlu belirteçimsiler ve çok boyutlu hassas özellikler  
için sezgisel bir çözüm sağlıyor. Deneysel sonuçlar bu algoritmaların  isimsizleştirme 
doğruluk payı açısından var olan diğer algoritmaları geride bıraktığını gösteriyor. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Motivations 
Governments, political parties, social associations, etc., need to stay in touch with 
their audiences. Understanding public opinion is essential for a democratic process. Public 
opinion helps political decision-makers to understand underlying issues that are of utmost 
importance to them. Issues such as discrimination, gay rights, abortion, cloning, capital 
punishment, affirmative action, euthanasia, and national security are examples of hot public 
opinion topics governments need a comprehensive analysis of [5-8]. Social research and 
opinion polls give people the opportunity to express their views regularly on different topics 
and provide an efficient way to measure public opinion. Since 1973, the European 
Commission has been monitoring the evolution of public opinion in the Member States [9], 
information which helps in the preparation of texts, decision-making and the evaluation of its 
work.  
A user profile needs to be constructed for individuals to participate in the public 
opinion process. These profiles contain valuable data about the user, such as nation, gender, 
city, and so on. These data may also contain Name, address, User’s social ID, Date of birth 
and Sex. Due to the rapid developments in computer and network technologies, many on-line 
public opinion polls and mobile-based public opinion systems are used in the opinion 
process, thus enabling greater participation. Therefore, the public opinion process must 
guarantee that individuals can express their preferences freely without any threats to their 
own privacy. Polls done under the risk of identification may not be accurate. 
For example, Figure 1 shows that in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, attitudes 
toward homosexuals are generally negative while the European and American voters are 
generally positive [10]. Voters with Yes/No from an opposing/supporting country may 
receive public pressure from majority of their countryman if their identities are revealed. If 
voters are not convinced that such a risk is small, they may not want to reveal their true 
opinion causing a bias towards the more common attitudes. 
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Figure 1 : Public opinions on acceptance homosexuality in different countries[10] 
 
Public opinion privacy means that neither the organizing authorities nor any other 
third party can link an opinion to the individual who has cast it. This requires achieving some 
degree of anonymity. As a naive approach, anonymity can be achieved by removing the 
attributes which uniquely identify individual users such as name, SSN, address, phone 
number. However, as shown in [11-14], this approach will not be enough to ensure 
anonymity due to the existence of quasi-identifier attributes (QI) which can be used together 
to identify individuals based on their profile information. Attributes like birth date, gender 
and ZIP code, when used together, can accurately identify individuals. [15] 
In this dissertation, we examine a case in which we have a large number of opinions 
and the data holder needs to publish this data. Adversaries can launch an attack based on user 
profile and public opinion. We focus on the protection of the relationship between the quasi-
identifiers and multiple sensitive attributes. Many works like k-anonymity, -diversity, t-
closeness, etc., have been proposed as a privacy protection model for micro data [3], [4]. 
However, most of models only deal with data with a single sensitive attribute [3], [16], [17], 
[18], [19],[20]. In addition, we aim to preserve privacy when there are correlations between 
sensitive attributes within same release or different releases. 
Various techniques can be employed to provide anonymity in a public opinion 
process. Most electronic voting schemes like the Blind signature scheme [21],[22] the 
Homomorphism scheme [2] and the Randomization-Based scheme [23] are based on 
cryptography techniques. These provide on-line privacy preservation for voters, which is also 
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suitable for use in the public opinion process. Also, k-Anonymous message transmission 
protocol [24] preserves user privacy during the voting process, and does not require the 
existence of trusted third parties. This technique tries to protect a user’s privacy during the 
voting process; however, in public opinion polls we need to provide anonymity after the 
opinions are collected and more specifically when the central servers want to publish this 
data.  
To limit sensitive information disclosure in data publishing, -Diversity [3] has been 
proposed. One definition of -diversity requires that there are at least  values of sensitive 
attributes in each equivalence class. It has been shown in [11], [25], [12] that under non-
membership information -diversity fails to protect privacy. As an example, Table 1 shows 
some voter’s records, where age and zip code are the quasi-identifiers and Issue1 and Issue2 
are the sensitive attributes. The anonymization in Table 2 satisfies 3-diversity on Issue1 alone 
and Issue2 alone. Consider an adversary who has the background knowledge that Amy will 
not vote for (c) on Issue1, thus the adversary can exclude the tuples with (c) on Issue1. Since 
the remaining tuples all have (w) on Issue2, the adversary will conclude Amy has voted (w) 
on Issue 2.  
 Quasi-Identifiers (QI) Sensitive Attributes (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code Issue1(I1) Issue2(I2) 
Amy 30 1200 b w 
Bob 20 2400 c x 
Che 23 1500 a w 
Dina 27 3400 c y 
 
Table 1 : The microdata sample T 
 
Quasi-Identifiers (QI) Sensitive Attributes (SA) 
Age Zip code Issue1(I1) Issue2(I2) 
[20-30] [1200-3400] b w 
[20-30] [1200-3400] c x 
[20-30] [1200-3400] a w 
[20-30] [1200-3400] c y 
 
Table 2 : Anonymized data T* 
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It has been shown in [11] that direct application of the techniques proposed for these 
models creates anonymizations that fail to protect privacy under additional background on 
non-memberships. As an example, take -diversity which ensures that each individual can at 
best be mapped to at least  sensitive values and suppose a data holder has the microdata 
given in Table 1. Directly applying a single-sensitive attribute -diversity (SSA-diversity) 
algorithm on the microdata would result in Table 2 which provides 3-diversity. (E.g., an 
adversary knowing the public table and seeing Table 2 can at best map, say Amy, to 3 distinct 
values a, b, and c for issue 1, and to w, x, and y for issue 2.) However, if the adversary also 
knows that Amy does not vote for c for issue 1, she can easily conclude that Amy voted for w 
for issue 2. Note that public opinion polls collect votes on many issues and it is easy to obtain 
such non-membership knowledge (compared to membership knowledge) making such attacks 
a threat in the domain of public opinions. 
 Explicit-Identifiers (EI) Quasi-Identifier (QI) 
Tuple ID SSN Name Age Zip code 
t1 2502 Bob 20 3000 
t2 2353 Ken 25 3500 
t3 2453 Peter 25 4000 
t4 1564 Sam 30 6500 
t5 5021 Jane 35 4500 
t6 9432 Linda 40 5500 
t7 5024 Alice 45 6000 
t8 1304 Mandy 50 5000 
t9 1202 Tom 55 6500 
 
Table 3 : Public data P 
 
5 
 
Work in [11] extended the definition of -diversity to provide protection against non-
memberships attacks. Their model ensures that an individual can at best be linked to at least  
distinct sensitive values and under i bits of non-membership knowledge, the released  data 
should still satisfy (-i)-diversity. 
For example in Table 4 and Table 5, each anonymization group satisfies 3-diversity that is 
every individual can at best be mapped to at least 3 sensitive values. Even if an adversary 
knows that, say Linda (t6), does not vote for c on issue1, the adversary will still not be sure 
whether Linda votes for y or x thus the model ensures 2-diversity within the group under one 
bit of non-membership knowledge. However, this work does not offer a probabilistic model. 
That is there is little relation between the privacy parameter  and the probability of 
disclosure. For example, the table in Table 5 is considered 3-diverse however the probability 
that Alice (t7) votes for c on issue1 is 1/2. This makes it difficult to make risk/benefit/cost 
analysis of publishing private data under a privacy parameter  [11, 12, 25]. 
 
 
 
Table 4 : Private data T 
 Quasi-Identifier (QI) Sensitive Attributes (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code Issue1 (I1) Issue2 ( I2) 
Bob(t1) 20 3000 a w 
Ken(t2) 25 3500 b z 
Peter(t3) 25 4000 d x 
Sam(t4) 30 6500 a x 
Jane(t5) 35 4500 b y 
Linda(t6) 40 5500 a y 
Alice(t7) 45 6000 c z 
Mandy(t8) 50 5000 a x 
Tom(t9) 55 6500 c w 
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 Quasi-Identifier (QI) Sensitive Attributes (SA) 
Tuple ID Age  Zip code I1 I2 
t1 [20-25] [3000-4000] a w 
t2 [20-25] [3000-4000] b z 
t3 [20-25] [3000-4000] d x 
t6 [40-55] [5000-6500] a y 
t7 [40-55] [5000-6500] c z 
t8 [40-55] [5000-6500] b x 
t9 [40-55] [5000-6500] c w 
t4 * * * * 
t5 * * * * 
Table 5 : Gal’s et al released data [11] 
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1.2 Contributions 
In this dissertation, we combine the best of the two worlds and propose two probabilistic 
models, MSA-diversity to preserving privacy for data with multiple sensitive attributes, and 
ρ-different to preserve privacy for dynamic data, which  
 protects against identification and non-membership attacks even when we have 
multiple sensitive attributes,  
 and bounds the probability of disclosure allowing risk analysis on the publisher side.  
More precisely, MSA- diversity ensures that the probability of mapping an individual to 
a sensitive value is bounded by 1/(-i) under i bits of non-membership knowledge. As an 
example, given =3, our technique generates the anonymization in Table 42 (page 60) in 
which the probability of disclosure is bounded by 1/3 for all individuals. If an adversary 
knows that, say Bob (t1), does not vote for d on issue1, the probability that he votes for, say 
a, on issue1; or say w, on issue2 is still bounded by 1/2. Our contribution in this thesis can be 
summarized as follows: 
1) Formally define probabilistically MSA-diversity privacy protection model for datasets 
with multiple sensitive attributes. 
2) Formally define probabilistically ρ-different privacy protection model for dynamic 
datasets. 
3) Design a heuristic anonymization algorithm for MSA-diversity. We borrow ideas 
from state of the art anonymization techniques such as Hilbert curve anonymization 
[26, 27] to increase utility.  
4) Moreover, a formally definition of a new attack for publishing dataset with fully 
dependent sensitive attributes. More details will be discussed in Chapter  4. 
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1.3 Structure of the Dissertation 
Unless otherwise stated, the dissertation examples will be on public opinion data. The 
data are practically organized as a table of rows (or records, or tuples) and columns (or fields, 
or attributes). The dissertation has seven chapters.  
Chapter ‎1 “INTRODUCTION”  
It provides an introduction to public opinion polls and its relation with privacy-
preserving data publishing. There is a clear demand for gathering and sharing public opinions 
without compromising the participant privacy. We demonstrate an example of public opinion 
polls and another example of challenges appears when publishing public opinions.  
Furthermore we declare contributions of this dissertation. 
Chapter ‎2 “BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS”  
This chapter presents some anonymization models for preserving privacy. In addition 
it explains a variety of attacks that can be used to disclose the released data, and the related 
privacy models proposed for preventing such attacks. All discussed models and attacks are 
applicable to one sensitive attribute. It is also presents three types of information loss metrics 
which will be used in the experiments part. These metrics are recently used by most of 
similar models and approaches in the privacy preserving data mining. 
Chapter ‎3 “PRIVACY-PRESERVING FOR MULTIPLE SENSITIVE ATTRIBUTES” 
It discusses most of the published work for preserving privacy for data with multiple 
sensitive attributes. In addition it explains the weaknesses and the attacks still applicable for 
the released data.  
Chapter  4 “PRIVACY-PRESERVING FOR DYNAMIC RELEASES” 
It explains recent work for preserving privacy for dynamic data releases and its 
relations with public opinion polls problem. As will it presents possible attacks applicable to 
the released data. ρ-different model will be present to preserve participants’ privacy. 
Chapter 5 “MSA DIVERSITY ALGORITHM” 
It explains in detail our MSA-diversity model. Also data preprocessing, Problem 
formulation, and constructing a probabilistic definition to preserve privacy are discussed. 
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Chapter ‎6 “EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS” 
It presents results of employing real data set to the MSA-model and Gal’s model. The 
experiments focus on the variation of the number sensitive attributes. In addition experiments 
show the effects of diversity variations. For case of comparison we show how MSA-model 
provides more accurate results than Gal et al’s model, what is more that MSA-model also 
presents the most accurate released data than other models described in chapter  3. 
Chapter ‎7 “CONCLUSIONS” 
It describes the overall conclusions and future work for releasing data with multiple 
sensitive attributes. 
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2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS  
2.1 Privacy of Public Opinions  
Public opinion is a psychological and social process to collect the individual views, 
attitude and beliefs about a specific topic. Public opinion has a significant impact on policy 
making process. A country president, parliament members, political parties, social groups, 
businessmen, human rights associations, journalists and consultants as well as candidate 
presidents and candidate parliament members, frequently ask the same question “How does 
the public think about a certain topic”. Public opinion is an indicator of the opposition and 
problems that may be faced in implementation of policies. Such information can be used by 
policy makers to device party, company or government policies to be realistic rather than 
idealistic. Politicians need to know public opinions to keep people trust and win reelection. 
Also, in private sources organizations as the Political Action Committees (PACs) raise 
money for or against elect  specific candidates. These groups can be very effective in policy 
decisions. Social groups may form interest groups to directly work to raise awareness and 
actively involved in everything from environmental issues to social issues, all having an 
impact on policy.  
Opinion polling is a way to understand public opinion. It tells us how a population 
thinks and feels about any given topic. It may use a survey, a questioner, electronic devices, 
web based polls or a mobile base polls. It categories individuals view about a specific 
viewpoint. Social scientists and scholars use polls results to explain why respondents still 
believe or change their minds about the poll topic. Opinion polling is usually designed to 
represent the opinions of people by conducting a series of questions and then conclude 
conceptions in ratio or within confidence intervals. These quantitative data often reveal 
citizens’ preferences, and tell us a sense of how people feel about policy issues, social 
practices, or lifestyle issues. Opinion polling was an important factor for Unites States 43
rd
 
president George W. Bush decision to attack Iraq in 2003 [28]. Bush conclude that American 
citizen support military actions. This example gives us how public opinion polling leads to 
critical decisions. 
Paper-form polling is traditional way to collect public opinion. A company organizing 
these polling needs to print many polling forms then destitute it in many places. This need a 
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large number of equipments and stuff, furthermore it’s time cost. The rapid developments in 
mobile, computer and network technologies change the whole polling process. Nowadays a 
company is able to use online systems such as web-based polling or social sites polling or 
even SMS messaging. Participants can use their own computers, tablet or smart phones to 
give her/his opinion. In order to implement web-based opinion polling, many companies 
construct a profile for each participant. This profile may contain important information about 
the participant such as user location, age, gender, occupation or marital status.  
The collection of public opinion information facilitates large-scale data mining and 
data analysis. The information holders such as governments, individual associations and 
companies have mutual benefits to sharing data among various parties.  Moreover, some 
regulations may require certain data to be released. For example, Netflix, a popular online 
movie and television rental service, aimed to improve the movie recommendations accuracy 
therefore released a data set contains anonymous movie ratings of 500,000 subscribers [29].  
Public opinion data contain sensitive information about individuals, and sharing such 
data immediately may reveal individual privacy. As a practical solution data holders may 
write an agreement, guidelines or general polices with other parties to restrict usage and 
storage of sensitive data. However to assume a high level trust is impractical solution. Such 
agreements cannot guarantee careless or misuse of sensitive data, which may lead to violate 
an individual privacy. A key point is to develop a practical approach keeps data useful and at 
same time protects individual privacy.  
 
 
 
2.2 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing 
The privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) aims protecting the private data and 
preserving the data utility as much as possible. In PPDP process we have three main users: 
Data Holder Individual participant Recipients 
Gathering data Releasing data 
Figure 2 : Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing general process 
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1. Individual participant: In public opinion polling, voter will participate and give her/his 
opinion in a certain topic. 
2. Data holder: such as a corporation who organizes the data collection and then 
anonymizes it. Data holder may be untrusted and gathering information to his own 
purposes. The voter should be responsible to untrusted data holder scenario and has 
the ability to decide if it’s possible to vote or not. Another scenario might be happen 
when there is a non-expert data holder. This may leads to publishing a mis-
anonymized data. Therefore it’s necessary to find a PPDP model to be used in this 
scenario. 
3. Data recipient: researchers who need the data to perform demographic research. Or 
might be an adversaries use the data to reveal individual privacy. 
A common type of the data gathered by data holders is a table form. Many data 
holders use this table for its simplicity to voters; also data holders can analyze it fast. A 
table attributes can be categorized as following:  
 Explicit Identifiers: provide a means to directly identify a participant, such as 
name, phone number, and social security number (SSN). 
 Quasi Identifiers: attributes can be used together to identify individuals based on 
their profile information. Attributes like birth date, gender and ZIP code, when 
used together, can accurately identify individuals. 
 Sensitive Attributes: contain personal privacy information like participants’ 
opinion or vote. 
 Non-Sensitive Attributes: which when be released will not affect participant 
directly or indirectly. 
The PPDP mechanism namely anonymization or sanitization, seeks to protect 
participants privacy by hiding the identity of each participant and/or the sensitive data. 
Sanitization mechanism represents the variety of all possible data publishing in an 
application of privacy-preserving data publishing. An anonymization algorithm may use 
Randomization, Generalization, Suppression, Swapping or Bucketization mechanism to 
publish a useful and safe data. [30]. 
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2.3 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing Models 
Removing Explicit-Identifiers attributes may not protect participant privacy. [13] 
shows a real-life privacy threat by linking a combination of attributes (zip code, date of birth, 
gender) from public voter table with released table. This combination of attributes called the 
Quasi-Identifiers. Research [31] showed that 87% of the U.S. population had reported 
characteristics that made them unique based on only such quasi-identifiers. For example, 
removing SSN and Name from Table 6 will produce Table 4, however it’s easy to re-identify 
participants by check the common Age and Zip code from Table 3 which publicity available 
and Table 4. 
 Explicit-Identifiers 
(EI) 
Quasi-Identifiers 
(QI) 
Sensitive Attributes 
(SA) 
Tuple ID SSN Name Age Zip code Issue1 (I1) Issue2 ( I2) 
t1 2502 Bob 20 3000 a w 
t2 2353 Ken 25 3500 b z 
t3 2453 Peter 25 4000 d x 
t4 1564 Sam 30 6500 a x 
t5 5021 Jane 35 4500 b y 
t6 9432 Linda 40 5500 a y 
t7 5024 Alice 45 6000 c z 
t8 1304 Mandy 50 5000 a x 
t9 1202 Tom 55 6500 c w 
Table 6 : Microdata Table MT 
 
Various privacy models have been proposed in literature. We can categories it in to 
three main types, Statistical models, Partition-based anonymization models and Probabilistic 
models. Some of often models will be described in the following sections.  
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2.3.1 Statistical Methods 
Some PPDP models use statistical methods to preserve individual privacy. In the 
following sections there will be a discussion about the randomization and swapping methods. 
2.3.1.1 The Randomization Method 
The randomization method has emerged as an important approach for data disguising 
in Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP). It uses data distortion methods in order to 
create private representations of the records [32, 33]. The randomization method adds noise 
to the sensitive data so the participants’ records are anonymized and at same time it preserves 
statistical information such as average or mean values. In most cases, it’s possible to 
reconstruct aggregate answers from the data distribution by subtracting the noise from the 
noisy data, however participant records cannot be recovered. The randomization method 
could be classified in to two main classes;  
 Random Perturbation method, which creates anonymized data by randomly 
perturbing the attribute values. 
 Randomized Response method, which samples anonymized data from a 
probability distribution, given that the added noise is drawn from a fixed 
distribution.  
Work in [34] showed that the addition of public information makes the randomization 
method vulnerable in unexpected ways. Moreover the randomization method is unable to 
guaranty privacy in the high dimensional case.  
 
2.3.1.2 Swapping Method 
Data swapping is to anonymize a dataset by exchanging values of sensitive attributes 
among data tuples [35]. It provides protection from identity disclosure and it’s a value-
invariant technique. Data swapping perfectly maintains univariate statistics and partially 
maintains lower-order multivariate statistics [36].  It can be used to preserve privacy for both 
numerical attributes and categorical attributes. Data protection level depends on the 
anonymization level induced in the data. Predefined criteria needed to specify tuples or 
values to be swapped. Often, a most rare tuples cause more data disclosure risk, therefore 
swapping method is commonly applies in this case. The key point is to find a suitable data 
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swapping algorithm which preserves released data as well as preserves dataset statistics. Data 
swapping method is done globally or locally. Globally swapping causes high impact on data 
utility, while locally or rank-based data swapping causes high error rates for aggregate 
queries. [37] work showed an example of privacy breach when an adversary has a prior belief 
on a unique attribute.  
2.3.2 Partitions-Based Anonymization 
Many models are designed to prevent disclosure of sensitive information by dividing 
data into groups of anonymous records. k-anonymity, -diversity, t-closeness and other 
models will be discussed in the following sections. 
2.3.2.1 The k-anonymity Model 
The basic idea of k-anonymity is to reduce the granularity of representation of the 
quasi-identifier attributes such a way each record contained in the released data cannot be 
distinguished from at least k-1 participants whose information also appears in the released 
data [13]. 
k-anonymity firstly removes explicit-identifier attributes, and then suppresses, 
generalizes or bucketizes quasi-identifier attributes. k-anonymity thus prevents quasi-
identifier linkages. At worst, the data released narrows down an individual entry to a group of 
k individuals. Unlike randomization models, k-anonymity assures that the data released is 
accurate. Many methods have been proposed for achieving k-anonymity. In addition 
proposed methods use many mechanisms as suppression, generalization and bucketization to 
represent anonymized data.  
Suppression mechanism:  
It refers to replace certain attribute with the most general value, which means not 
releasing a value at all. Table 7 shows a released table satisfy 2-anonymity. t1 and t8 has been 
totally suppressed which means totally data loss. For t2 and t3 the zip code attribute has been 
suppressed. In t4 and t9 the age attribute has been suppressed. There are many suppression 
types like: 
 Tuples suppression: one or more tuples will be suppressed. It’s useful for 
outlier tuples. 
 Cell suppression: one or more cells will be suppressed, where a cell 
represents an attribute value for a tuple.  
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 Attribute Suppression: one or more attributes will be suppressed. It’s often 
used to suppress the explicitly identifier attributes.   
Work [13] showed a model which combines generalization and suppression to achieve k-
anonymity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Generalization mechanism:  
It refers to replace a value with a less specific value based on a predefined domain 
hierarchy trees. For instance generalize Age value 35 to Age range of values [30-45]. Table 8 
represents a released table satisfying 3-anonymity. There are 3 identical tuples for each quasi-
identifier. Using the hierarchy tree in Figure 3 (a), the age value for t1 and t2 have been 
generalized from 20 and 25 values to range of values 2* which equivalent to [20 - 29] and the 
(*) icon means all possible values in its position. After generalizing some attribute values, the 
set of quasi-identifier (QI) attributes (age and zip code) of tuples t1 and t2 become identical. 
Each group of tuples that have identical QI attribute values is called an equivalence class. 
  (QI)  (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code Issue1 (I1) Issue2 ( I2) 
t1 * * * * 
t2 25 * b z 
t3 25 * d x 
t4 * 6500 a x 
t5 * * b y 
t6 * * a y 
t7 * * c z 
t8 * * * * 
t9 * 6500 c w 
Table 7 : Suppression mechanism 
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Figure 3 (b) represents a range-based example of constructing a hierarchy tree. 
Generalization is created by generalizing all values in an attribute to a specific level of 
generalization. Obviously more generalization decreases data utility therefore a 
generalization mechanism must generalize the data not more than needed. 
Attribute Generalization: It is applied at the level of column. When we perform 
generalization on column, it generalizes all values which belong to that column.  
Cell Generalization: We can perform generalization on any particular cell of any attributes 
rather than whole column. Using this we can generalize only those cells that need 
generalization. Disadvantage of this approach is that it will increase complexities to manage 
values which are generalized at various levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (QI)  (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code Issue1 (I1) Issue2 ( I2) 
t1 [20-25] [3000-4000] a w 
t2 [20-25] [3000-4000] b z 
t3 [20-25] [3000-4000] d x 
t4 [30-45] [4500-6500] a x 
t5 [30-45] [4500-6500] b y 
t6 [30-45] [4500-6500] a y 
t7 [45-55] [5000-6500] c z 
t8 [45-55] [5000-6500] a x 
t9 [45-55] [5000-6500] c w 
Table 8 : Generalization mechanism 
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Bucketization mechanism:  
Instead modifying QI attributes and sensitive attributes, it divides the tuples into non-
overlapping groups (buckets) and assigns a GID for each group. Then it publishes two tables, 
the first table with QI and the corresponding group GID and the second table with sensitive 
attributes and the corresponding group GID. Here each group works as a quasi-identifier and 
the sensitive attribute value of any participant would not be distinguish from any other 
participant in the same group.  Table 9 shows two tables as result of bucketization 
mechanism. The first table represents QI tuples and the second represents SA tuples. 
However bucketization mechanism suffers from membership disclosure. Adversary can use 
the QI from the first table to check if a certain participant in this data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tuple ID Age Zip code GID  GID Issue1 (I1) 
t1 20 3000 1  1 a 
t2 25 3500 1  1 b 
t3 25 4000 1  1 d 
t4 30 6500 3  3 a 
t5 35 4500 2  2 b 
t6 40 5500 2  2 a 
t7 45 6000 3  3 c 
t8 50 5000 2  2 a 
t9 55 6500 3  3 c 
 (a) QI table   (b) SA table 
Table 9 : Bucketization mechanism 
2* 
* 
25 
(a) Prefix-based 
Any 
[20-55) 
 
 [20-30) 
 
 [30-55) 
 
 [30-45) 
 
 [45-55) 
 
(b) Range-based 
Figure 3 : Age generalization tree 
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However k-anonymity does not provide full privacy due to the lack of diversity in the 
SA values (Homogeneity Attack) and if the adversary has additional background knowledge 
(Background knowledge Attack) these attacks will be discussed in details in section  2.3.3.2. 
2.3.2.2 -diversity Model 
-diversity is an effective model to remedy k-anonymity drawbacks. It’s not only 
preventing identification of a tuple but also it preventing inference of the sensitive values of 
the attributes of that tuple. The -diversity model for privacy requires that there are at least  
“well-represented” values of sensitive attributes in each equivalence class. Work [3] 
presented a number of different instantiations for the -diversity definition which differ the 
meaning of being “well-represented”. Simply it can mean  distinct values. Table 10 (b) 
shows a released table satisfies 2-diversity. There are three groups where t1, t2 and t3 are in 
the same group and have identical QI values. In each group, there are at least two distinct SA 
values. 
 (QI) (SA)  (QI) (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code Issue1 (I1)  Age Zip code Issue1 (I1) 
t1 20 3000 a  [20-25] [3000-4000] a 
t2 25 3500 b  [20-25] [3000-4000] b 
t3 25 4000 d  [20-25] [3000-4000] d 
t4 30 6500 a  [30-40] [4500-6500] a 
t5 35 4500 b  [30-40] [4500-6500] b 
t6 40 5500 a  [30-40] [4500-6500] a 
t7 45 6000 c  [45-55] [5000-6500] c 
t8 50 5000 a  [45-55] [5000-6500] a 
t9 55 6500 c  [45-55] [5000-6500] c 
 (a)     (b)   
Table 10 : -diversity model 
 
However as shown in Table 10 the third group t7, t8 and t9 has two sensitive attributes where 
(c) value more frequent than (a) value. Therefore distinct -diversity cannot prevent 
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probabilistic inference attacks. Moreover -diversity does not consider semantic meaning of 
SA values therefore it cannot prevent similarity attack. 
2.3.2.3 t-closeness Model 
t-closeness model [4] bounds distance between the distribution of a sensitive attribute 
in any equivalence class and the distribution of a sensitive attribute in the overall dataset by a 
predefined threshold t. t-closeness model can prevent skewness attack (will be discussed in 
Section  2.5.4). Consider a voter table where 90% of tuples have (c) SA value and 10% of 
tuples have (a) SA value. Assume that we released a table satisfies 2-diversity. This group 
has 50% of (c) and 50% of (a). However, this group presents a serious privacy risk because 
any tuple in the group could be inferred as having (a) with 50% confidence, compared to 10% 
in the overall table. Such attack called skewness attack and t-closeness model can prevent it. 
The Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) method [38] is used in order to quantify the distance 
between the two distributions of SA values.  Many distance metric methods have been 
proposed. Kullback-Leibler, Weighted-Mean-Variance and Chi Square but these don’t take 
into account ground distance (semantic distance), but EMD considers it. The EMD is based 
on the minimum amount of work required to transform one finite distribution into another 
one by moving distribution mass between each other [39]. 
Due to [40]  the EMD function cannot prevents attribute linkage on numerical 
sensitive attributes. Moreover t-closeness forcing all released groups to have close 
distribution to the original data which negatively affects the data utility. Also t-closeness 
generalizes each attribute independently which causes loss correlation between different 
attributes [41]. 
2.3.2.4 Other Models 
δ-Presence: work [42] presented δ-Presence metric to prevent table linkage threat. It 
concerns the case where a participant presence in the database causes a serious privacy risk. 
δ-Presence bounds the probability of inferring the presence of any participant within a range 
δ = (δmin, δmax). 
Personalized Privacy: work [43] presented personalized privacy metric to allow each 
participant to specify her/his own privacy level based on a predefined taxonomy tree for SA. 
For example a participant may be does not mind if others know that she/he have been voted 
positively/negatively for a certain topic. A table satisfies personalized anonymity with a 
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certain threshold if no adversary can infer the privacy requirement of any tuple with a 
probability above the threshold. 
(X, Y )-Linkability, (α, k)-Anonymity, LKC-Privacy and more proposed to give a 
general privacy preserving.  
2.3.3 Probabilistic Model 
Recently some probabilistic models [44-47] are designed to prevent disclosure of 
sensitive information by providing ability to statistical queries. ε-differential, (c, t)-isolation 
and (d, γ)-privacy will be discussed in the following sections. 
2.3.3.1 Differential Privacy 
As an alternative of the partition-based models, differential privacy allows only 
statistical queries like sum or count queries. [46] proposes ε-differential privacy model to 
preserve privacy. It shows that the risk of addition or removal of a tuple doesn’t affect the 
released data privacy. Consequently the computations will be insensitive to any changes in 
any tuple. Moreover the adversary will gain nothing. A random function Ƒ will be used to 
generate the data to be released, such that Ƒ is not very sensitive to any tuple in the data set.  
Formally, A randomized function F gives ε-differential privacy if for all data sets D and D’ 
differing on at most a single user, and all T ⊆ Range(Ƒ), where ε is a positive real constant. 
Pr[Ƒ(D)  ∈  T]
Pr[Ƒ(D′)  ∈  T]
≤ exp(ε) 
The key point is to add random noise to the queries answers so that the answer 
changes but not the overall statistics. Therefore more queries means more noise needed to be 
added. This noise depends on ε and the sensitivity of the function Ƒ. 
Differential privacy has two kind of interaction, non-interactive and interactive 
approaches. In the non-interactive approach all queries have to be known in advanced. After 
that a perturbed version of the data created. While the interactive approach answers only a 
sub linear number of queries [48]. In differential privacy model there is no assumption about 
adversary’s belief or tuples dependency [49]. 
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2.3.3.2  (c, t)-Isolation 
An adversary may try to isolate or to eliminate a tuple (a participant) from a dataset. 
PPDP requires that, using released data and background information should not increase the 
adversary ability to isolate any tuple. Work [15] has proposed a privacy model (c, t)-isolation 
to prevent tuple isolation in a statistical database. Suppose a data set D has been anonymized 
and released. Let D has n tuples. Suppose those tuples are represented as points in a certain 
space, where p is a point in D space and q is a point in D’ space. The adversary is able to 
know the q point. Let δ be the distance between p and q. Let B(q, cδ) is a ball of radius cδ 
around point q. Then the point q (c, t)-isolates point p if B(q, cδ) contains fewer than t points 
in the table. where c is an isolation parameter and t is a threshold of privacy. (c,t)-isolation 
can be viewed as a record linkage problem and is suitable for problems with numerical 
attributes.  
2.3.3.3  (d, γ)-Privacy  
Work [47] presented a probabilistic privacy model (d, γ)-privacy, which relates the 
adversary’s prior belief P(t) for a given tuple t, with the posterior belief P(t|D) for the same 
tuple. (d, γ)-privacy shows that when the P(t) is small, there is a reasonable trade-off between 
privacy and utility. The privacy definition requires that the posterior belief P(t|D) ≤ γ and 
P(t|D)
P(t)
≥
d
γ
 .  
2.4 Complexity of finding optimal k-anonymity 
In [50] work, authors have considered the complexity of finding an optimal value of k 
which ensure the anonymity of tuples up to a group of size k, while minimizing the amount of 
information loss. They showed that optimal k-anonymization for multi-dimensional QI is NP-
hard under the suppression model. Therefore to minimize the number of suppressed tuples, a 
greedy approximate model has been proposed. Two approximation algorithms were propose: 
the first algorithm runs in time O(n
2k
) and achieves an approximation bound of O(k log k), 
the second algorithm runs in a polynomial running time. Recently many improved models has 
been proposed  and showed  an approximation bound of O(log k) [51]. In [18] work, authors 
point up that suppression model is a special case of generalization model; furthermore they 
show that k-anonymization is also NP-hard under generalization model. 
Data recording is a way to achieve k-anonymity based on generalization. There are 
two kinds of recording: global-recording and local-recording. In global-recording, same value 
in an attributes must generalize to the same level. In local-recording, same value in an 
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attribute may generalize to different levels. Global-recording may cause a higher information 
loss than local-recording. For example, Table 11(a) shows a generalization for Age and Zip 
code attributes, where the first generalization in Table 11(b) is global-recording based and the 
second generalization in Table 11(c) is local-recording. It’s clear that in Table 11(b) the 
tuples t7, t8 and t9 are generalized more than the corresponding tuples in Table 11(c). 
In multi-dimensional generalization, recording may work in each attribute separately 
or mapping the Cartesian product of all attributes. Work [26] showed that applying recording 
process in the Cartesian product is more accurate than the separated manner.  Most of recent 
research like [23, 52]  proposed algorithms for one dimension and global-recording.   
Specialization is the reverse operates of generalization. It is a top-down process, 
which starts from the most general value and dividing data based on predefined conditions.  
 
 (QI)  (QI)  (QI) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code  Age Zip code  Age Zip code 
t1 20 3000  [20-25] [3000-4000]  [20-25] [3000-4000] 
t2 25 3500  [20-25] [3000-4000]  [20-25] [3000-4000] 
t3 25 4000  [20-25] [3000-4000]  [20-25] [3000-4000] 
t4 30 6500  [30-40] [4500-6500]  [30-40] [4500-6500] 
t5 35 4500  [30-40] [4500-6500]  [30-40] [4500-6500] 
t6 40 5500  [30-40] [4500-6500]  [30-40] [4500-6500] 
t7 45 6000  [45-55] [4500-6500]  [45-55] [5000-6500] 
t8 50 5000  [45-55] [4500-6500]  [45-55] [5000-6500] 
t9 55 6500  [45-55] [4500-6500]  [45-55] [5000-6500] 
 (a)   (b)   (c)  
Table 11: Global-recoding and local-recoding 
 
In Chapter  5 a local-recording, multi-dimensional generalization algorithm will be 
presented.   
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2.5 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing Possible Attacks 
Many PPDP algorithms have been proposed in order to protect data after publishing it 
and at same time preserve maximum utility. However many attacks have been proposed to 
reveal participant privacy. One of the most cited example of this type of privacy breach is the 
AOL search data leak. In 2006, AOL researchers recently published the search logs of about 
650,000 members. The release intended for research purposes. Unfortunately, AOL did not 
notice that users’ searches may potentially identify individual users. Using search engines to 
find an individual’s name, address or a telephone number, could then leads to a specific 
individual. The release replaced users' names with persistent pseudonyms. It did not take 
much inspecting for The New York Times to conclude that searched words belong to Thelma 
Arnold, a 62-year-old widow who lives in Lilburn, Ga. [53] In the next section the often 
privacy attacked will be discussed. 
2.5.1 Linking Attack 
Simply removing Explicitly-identifier (EI) attributes not enough. Using linking attack; 
an adversary still be able to identify individual participant by linking external data to 
anonymized data [13]. 
k-anonymity model provide a solution to avoid linking attacks. It requires that each 
record in the released data is identical to at least k-1. Table 12 shows an example how the 
adversary compares QI values in the anonymized table (a) and public data (b). It obvious that 
t1 has the same QI values in both tables which conclude with high probability that they are 
the same participant.  
  (QI)  (SA)   (EI)  (QI) 
Tuple ID Age Zipcode Issue1  Issue2   SSN Name Age Zip 
t1 20 3000 a w  2502 Bob 20 3000 
t2 25 3500 b z  1304 Mandy 50 5000 
t3 25 4000 d x  1202 Tom 55 6500 
t4 30 6500 a x  1564 Sam 30 6500 
 (a) anonymized data  (b) Public  data 
Table 12 : Linking Attack  
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2.5.2 Homogeneity Attack  
Appears when an anonymous data groups lack of diversity. Table 13 shows a 2-
anonymity anonymized data, for the first group there are two tuples with same SA value. 
Therefore an adversary can easily reveal participant’s privacy. k-anonymity requires each 
tuple in anonymized data to appear at least k times, but does not say anything about the SA 
values. If a SA values in a QI group are same then it violate privacy requirements.  
-diversity suggests that as improvement to k-anonymity, the anonymized groups should 
diverse the SA values for each QI attribute.[3] 
 (QI)  (SA) 
Age Zip code  (I1) 
   
[20-30] [1200-3400] c 
[20-30] [1200-3400] c 
   
[30-40] [5600-6600] a 
[30-40] [5600-6600] b 
Table 13 :  Homogeneity and background knowledge attacks  
 
2.5.3 Background Knowledge Attack 
An adversary has background knowledge about the SA values. For example if the 
adversary knows that certain city supports certain party with very high confidence. In Table 
13 if the city has the zipcode 6600 and support choice (a) and appears in the second group, 
then the adversary can concludes that participants from city with zipcode 5600 has been 
voted for I1 by (b). k-anonymity does not protect against background knowledge attack.  
-diversity provides a solution by increasing the diversity of SA values for each anonymized 
group. 
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2.5.4 Skewness Attack 
Adversary can reveal participants privacy if anonymized groups have a non-uniform 
distribution of SA values. -diversity model prevents direct attribute disclosure; however it 
doesn’t provide a sufficient distribution for sensitive attribute values. Table 14 shows an 
anonymized data which satisfies 2-diversity. The SA values include four (a) values and one 
(b) value. This implies that the participants have been voted for (a) choice by probability 
80%. This type of privacy threats called Skewness attack. t-closeness [4] model provides a 
solution for this attack. It bounds the data set distribution distance between the distribution of 
SA values in the original data set and the released data for each group. 
(QI)  (SA) 
Age Zip code  (I1) 
   
[20-30] [1200-3400] a 
[20-30] [1200-3400] a 
[20-30] [1200-3400] a 
[20-30] [1200-3400] a 
[20-30] [1200-3400] b 
Table 14 : Skewness attack  
 
 
2.5.5 Similarity Attack 
Participant’s privacy may be at risk if sensitive attribute values of anonymized groups 
are similar. An anonymization algorithm must consider semantic meanings of SA values. In 
public opinion polls such attack is rarely happen. Table 15 shows a 3-diversity anonymized 
data. Assume choices (a) and (b) have closed mining (first opinion) and choice (f) has a 
totally opposite meaning (second opinion). Then the similarity between (a) and (b) will 
implies that voters have choose 80% of the first opinion.       
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(QI)  (SA) 
Age Zip code  (I1) 
   
[20-30] [1200-3400] a 
[20-30] [1200-3400] b 
[20-30] [1200-3400] a 
[20-30] [1200-3400] b 
[20-30] [1200-3400] f 
Table 15 : Similarity attack  
2.5.6 Membership Disclosure 
An adversary can discover whether a participant presence in the released data or not. 
People have the right to hide their participation in any public opinion process. Bucketization 
mechanism for instant does not prevent this attack as we mentioned in  2.3.2.1. Generalization 
and slicing mechanisms [54] prevent membership attack. 
2.5.7 Multiple Release Attack 
A microdata often has to perform many operations for its tuples.  Insertions, deletions 
and updates operations may leads to republishing a new anonymized version. However 
multiple releases open to be linked together which may compromise data privacy (will be 
discussed in more details in chapter  4). A suggested solution is to consider all of the released 
data before publishing the new one. But it’s not always the case.  Data publisher may not 
notice that another release may happen in future; also other data holders are able to release 
some data. Table 16 shows a 3-anonymity and 2-diversity for the first release R1 and the 
second release R2. Assume an adversary knows that a voter presented in both releases and 
she/he is 40 years old and living in a city with 3000 zipcode. Examining R1 and R2 together, 
the adversary can eliminates r1, r2 and r6 tuples. Also the adversary can eliminate tuple r3 or 
r4 due to the distribution of SA values in R1.    
Preventing such attacks, called Multiple Release or correspondence attacks, needs to 
consider all changes occurred to the data moreover to consider the anonymization models 
used in previous releases [55-58]. 
28 
 
 
  (QI)  (SA)   (QI) (SA) 
TID Age Zipcode Issue1   TID Age Zipcode Issue1  
t1 [20-40] 30** a  r1 2* 3*** a 
t2 [20-40] 30** a  r2 2* 3*** a 
t3 [20-40] 30** b  r3 4* 3*** b 
     r4 4* 3*** b 
     r5 4* 3*** a 
     r6 2* 3*** b 
 (a) Release 1 (R1)  (b) Release 2 (R2) 
Table 16 : Multiple release attack  
 
2.5.8 Minimality Attack 
In addition to background knowledge and anonymized data, adversaries may have 
access to algorithms used to anonymize data. Based in this knowledge, work [59] presented a 
minimality attack which may be used by adversaries to breach participants’ privacy. Using a 
probabilistic formula, an adversary eliminates impossible cases in order to launch elimination 
attack. In general, the minimality principle state that a generalization algorithm should not 
synthesized data more than its necessary to achieve its requirement.   
2.5.9 Inference Attack 
Inference attack occurs when an adversary is able to infer a sensitive data with high 
confidence. The adversary deduces the sensitive data using trivial information. Even if the QI 
is not fully released it may be possible to infer missing QI values from other information. It’s 
possible to infer gender or religion from name, birth year from graduation year [60]. Several 
works [61-63] have proposed solutions for inference attack. 
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2.5.10 deFinetti Attack 
Using a statistical theorem known as deFinetti’s theorem, [64] showed that using a 
group of anonymized data deFinetti attack can build a classifier to predict the SA value 
associate with this group. Firstly, deFinetti attack guessing a random permutation for each QI 
in order to assign a SA value to each tuple. This step produces a set of conditional 
distributions as following  Pr(𝑄𝐼𝑖 |𝑆𝐴𝑗 ) where i is |QI| and j is the number of distinct SA 
values in each QI. The set of conditional distributions can be described as a classifier. 
Secondly, in each QI deFinetti attack uses the classifier to check the relative likelihood for 
the guessed permutation. Iteratively the process will construct a precise classifier. Thirdly, 
Anonymized data and the constructed classifier can be used to reveal participant privacy. 
[65].      
As showed in [64] deFinetti attack can be used against any model uses tuple-
independent model, the random-worlds method [66], or independent and identically 
distributed model.  
 
2.6 INFORMATION LOSS METRICS 
As mentioned in Chapter  1, one of the primary goals of data publishing utility is the 
quality of the released dataset. Unfortunately, de-identification of datasets degrades the utility 
of the dataset giving us a trade-off between privacy and utility. A good anonymization not 
only satisfies the underlying privacy standard but also minimizes information loss due to 
generalizations. To achieve such an anonymization, we first need a metric to measure the 
level of utility of a given anonymized dataset. A typical utility metric measures the data 
quality in the released data with respect to the data quality in the original dataset. This 
chapter describes three commonly used information loss metrics:  
2.6.1 Discernibility Metric 
The Discernibility Metric (DM) penalizes by a value of the anonymized group size 
each unsuppressed tuple and assigned a penalty of the input dataset size for each suppressed 
tuple. In addition each suppressed tuple incurs a cost |T|. Given that we did not perform any 
tuple suppression then the DM error is the normalized sum of all assigned penalties [23], 
[24]. The certainty loss is the sum of intervals size on all attributes of the generalized tuples 
[41]. DM can be mathematically stated as follows: 
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DM(T*) = ∑ tT|EC(t)|
2 
Where t is a tuple from T and EC(t) is the Equivalence Class of T* indistinguishable from t. ( 
EC defined in section  5.1) 
 
2.6.2 Loss Metric 
The information loss metric (LM) is the sum of all normalized information loss for 
each column in the anonymized table. LM is between 0 and 1, where 0 means no information 
loss and 1 means total information loss. We use the [67] definition, which described 
mathematically as follows: For attributes with numerical values, assume for each interval the 
lower and upper values be L and U respectively. The information loss can be calculated by 
LM(T*) = ∑ tT(Ui-Li)/(U-L) 
For attributes with categorical values, assume N is the total number of leaf nodes in R. and 
NP is the total number of leaf nodes in a sub tree rooted in P. consider the generalization 
based on the domain generalization structure Ɽ (as shown in Figure 3). 
 
2.6.3 Average Query Error 
The Average Relative Error (AvRE) [68] measures the distortion by comparing the 
counts of the randomly generated SQL queries over T* to the counts over T. AvRE for each 
tuple can be measured as |act – est|/act. Where act means the actual results driven from the 
original data and est means the estimated results driven from the sanitized data. 
In the chapter  6 we will show a comparison between MSA-diversity model and Gal’s 
et al model in term of the Discernibility Metric, Loss Metric and Average Relative Error. 
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3. PRIVACY-PRESERVING FOR MULTIPLE SENSITIVE 
ATTRIBUTES 
Typical public opinion polls cover a very large number of issues. Each issue is 
recognized as a sensitive attribute. Therefore we will deal with multiple sensitive attributes in 
order to develop an efficient model. The data holder needs to publish a large number of 
opinions about many issues. Adversaries use participants’ profiles and public opinion to 
launch an attack. The main idea is to protect and secure the relationship between the quasi-
identifiers and multiple sensitive attributes. Many works like k-anonymity, -diversity, t-
closeness, etc., have been proposed as a privacy protection model for microdata [3], [4]. 
However, most of models assume there is one single sensitive attribute in the microdata table.  
 
 Explicit Identifiers 
(EI) 
Quasi Identifiers 
(QI) 
Sensitive Attributes 
(SA) 
Tuple ID SSN Name Age Zip code I1 I2 I3 … Id 
t1 2502 Bob 20 3000 a w e  k 
t2 2353 Ken 25 3500 b z e  m 
t3 2453 Peter 25 4000 d x f  k 
t4 1564 Sam 30 6500 a x e  k 
t5 5021 Jane 35 4500 b y g  n 
t6 9432 Linda 40 5500 a y f  l 
t7 5024 Alice 45 6000 c z f  m 
t8 1304 Mandy 50 5000 a x h  l 
t9 1202 Tom 55 6500 c w g  n 
Table 17 : Microdata Table with (d) SA 
 
Table 17 shows an example for a microdata with multiple sensitive attributes.  I1,  I2, 
to Id are opinions for different issues. Each issue has a number of distinct choices and a 
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participant can choose one. Issues can be related to each other, and have a strong dependency. 
In this case their joint distribution will be similar; therefore we can consider them as one 
issue. Also issues can be independent from each other, thus their join distribution are 
different. In this case we consider them as different issues.  
At present, few multiple sensitive attributes models have been proposed in the 
literature to prevent re-identification risks caused by external knowledge. In the following 
subsections will discuss it. 
3.1 Naïve Approach 
It has been shown in [11] [12], [25], that under non-membership information -
diversity fails to protect privacy. Simply using -diversity for MSA will cause privacy breach.  
As an example, Table 18 (i) shows some voter’s records. The anonymization in Table 
18 (ii) satisfies 3-diversity on I1 alone and I2 alone. Consider an adversary who has the 
background knowledge that Amy will not vote for (c) on I1, thus the adversary can exclude 
the tuples with (c) on I1. Since the remaining tuples all have (w) on I2, the adversary will 
conclude Amy has voted (w) on I2.  
 
 (QI) (SA)  (QI) (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code I1 I2  Age Zip code I1 I2 
Amy 30 1200 b w  [20-30] [1200-3400] b w 
Bob 20 2400 c x  [20-30] [1200-3400] c x 
Che 23 1500 a w  [20-30] [1200-3400] a w 
Dina 27 3400 c y  [20-30] [1200-3400] c y 
 i. Microdata  ii. Anonymized data 
 
Table 18 : The microdata and anonymized data sample T 
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3.2 Machanavajjhala’s et al. Approach 
According to work by [3], if we have two sensitive attributes, the main idea is to treat 
the first sensitive attribute as part of the quasi-identifier when checking for diversity in the 
second sensitive attribute (and vice versa). Thus we can ensure the diversity principle is held 
for the entire dataset. However, this solution is impractical for use in public opinion data 
because of the huge number of opinions each participant is expected to express. Also the 
sensitive attribute which treated as part of QI may be generalized, which will rise the 
information utility loss. 
 
 (QI) (SA)  (QI) (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code I1 I2  Age Zip code I2 I1 
Amy 30 1200 b w  30 1200 w b 
Bob 20 2400 c x  20 2400 x c 
Che 23 1500 a w  23 1500 w a 
Dina 27 3400 c y  27 3400 y c 
 i. Treat I1 as a part of QI  ii. Treat I2 as a part of QI 
Table 19 :  Microdata of Machanavajjhala et al. approach for MSA 
 
Consider the row microdata in Table 19. As first phase, suppose I1 treated as a part of 
QI, then checking the diversity of I2 will produce the anonymized data in Table 20(i). Second 
phase treat I2 as part of QI and check I1 diversity. As result shown in Table 20(ii) to produce 
2-diversity data, this approach generalized the QI and SA which causes utility loss. 
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 (QI) (SA)  (QI) (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code I1 I2  Age Zip code I2 I1 
Amy [20-30] [1200-3400] [a,b] w  [20-30] [1200-3400] w [a,b] 
Che [20-30] [1200-3400] [a,b] w  [20-30] [1200-3400] w [a,b] 
Bob  [20-30] [1200-3400] c x  [20-30] [1200-3400] [x,y] c 
Dina [20-30] [1200-3400] c y  [20-30] [1200-3400] [x,y] c 
 i.  First phase  ii. Second phase (2-diversity) 
Table 20 : Anonymized data of Machanavajjhala et al. approach for MSA 
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3.3 Li and Ye Approach 
Work by [25] provided a two-step greedy generalization algorithm, which is used to 
carry out the multiple sensitive attributes processing. First phase: quasi-identifiers are 
generalized using a top-down specialization greedy algorithm. It starting with the whole data 
set as a single group and then trying to split it to smaller groups until further split will violate 
α-QI condition, where α-QI is the diversity requirement for QI. α-QI is predefined by data 
holder. Second phase: sensitive attributes are masked (generalized) using a bottom-up local 
recording algorithm. It checks the α-SA condition for each equivalence class - which 
constructed in the first phase-, where α-SA is the diversity requirement for SA. α-SA is 
predefined by data holder. 
However, in the public opinion case we have few choices for each sensitive attribute 
which leads to a huge information loss if we apply the masking step of this solution. 
Moreover [25] doesn’t construct groups in  a probabilistic manner, which may leads to have 
one SA value more frequent than other SA values within a group.  For example, Table 21 
shows the process to satisfy α-QI = α-SA = 2. In the first phase there are two equivalence 
classes. In the second phase due to the local generalization step there are suppressions to two 
values. w value in the first equivalence class will be suppressed and c value in the second 
equivalence class will be suppressed.  
 
 (QI) (SA)  (QI) (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code I1 I2  Age Zip code I1 I2 
          
Amy 30 1200 b w  [23-30] [1200-1500] b * 
Che  23 1500 a w  [23-30] [1200-1500] a * 
          
Bob 20 2400 c x  [20-27] [2400-3400] * x 
Dina 27 3400 c y  [20-27] [2400-3400] * y 
 i. First phase  ii. Second phase 
Table 21 : Li and Ye approach 
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3.4 Gal’s et al Model 
Work by [11] mentions that the table T satisfies both k-anonymity and -diversity if T 
is divided into a partition and each group contains at least k records, and to delete all rows in 
the group, at least  distinct values need to be deleted to delete all rows in the group. T is also 
anatomized or generalized. However this work isn’t the most appropriate approach to this 
problem. [11] model works top down, it starting with the whole data set as a single group and 
then trying to split it to smaller groups until further split will violate k-anonymity and -
diversity conditions.  
Using dataset in Table 4, as shown in  
Figure 4 it starts by select the attribute with widest normalized range. In this example it’s 
possible to choose Zip code or Age. By choosing the Age attribute and split it in to two 
groups 3000-5000 and 5500-6500 look to ( 
Figure 4). Then we will have t1, t2, t3, t5 and t8 in G1 and t4, t6, t7 and t9 in G2. Even the 
first part t1, t2, t3, t5 and t8 can construct G1 the second part cant construct any group. 
Therefore it’s only possible to make one partition and exclude the rest.  
It’s also possible choosing Age attribute to split the data to two groups. As results [11] 
will give us two groups t1, t2 and t3 as G1, t6, t7, t8 and t9 as G2, t4 and t5 will be excluded. 
Table 22 shows the anonymized data. 
 (QI) (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code I1 I2 
     
t1 20-25 3000-4000 a w 
t2 20-25 3000-4000 b z 
t3 20-25 3000-4000 d x 
     
t6 40-55 5000-6500 a y 
t7 40-55 5000-6500 c z 
t8 40-55 5000-6500 b x 
t9 40-55 5000-6500 c w 
     
t4 * * * * 
t5 * * * * 
Table 22 : Gal’s et al released data T*1 
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Figure 4 shows a 2D space, where the x-dimension is Zipcode And y-dimension is Age. Each 
cell indicates a tuple in the dataset of Table 4. Dashed line represent [11] partitioning process. 
Assuming normal distribution, the probability that a tuple with age = 25 and Zipcode = 4000 
is 1/64. Where 64 is the total number of data cells. Clearly [11] model causes a large 
information loss. [11] model focuses on both k-anonymity and -diversity anonymization. 
However, [3] work mentions the k-anonymity drawbacks and how it fails to preserve privacy 
practically. k-anonymity still can’t prevent homogeneity attack and background knowledge 
attack. Therefore focusing on -diversity will provide stronger privacy preserving. 
 
 
Figure 4 : 3-diversity groups using Gal’s et al. model 
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3.5 Xiao-Chun et al Model 
Work by [12] shows a multi-dimensional bucket grouping for SA with multiple 
attributes. Table 24 shows the anonymized data of Table 23 based on the maximal multi-
dimension-capacity first algorithm. However it’s clear that [12] can’t prevent membership 
attack. Furthermore it doesn’t present a probabilistic model. For example, the G3 in Table 24 
has the probability that Mandy (t8) votes for z on issue2 is 2/3. This makes it difficult to 
make risk/benefit/cost analysis of publishing private data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Quasi-Identifier (QI) Sensitive Attributes (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code Issue1 (I1) Issue2 ( I2) 
Bob(t1) 20 3000 a f 
Ken(t2) 25 3500 a w 
Peter(t3) 25 4000 a x 
Sam(t4) 30 6500 b f 
Jane(t5) 35 4500 b w 
Linda(t6) 40 5500 c y 
Alice(t7) 45 6000 c y 
Mandy(t8) 50 5000 d z 
Tom(t9) 55 6500 e f 
Table 23 : Microdata for Xiao-Chun et al. model  
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  (QI)   (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code Group ID  Group ID I1,  I2 
t1 20 3000 G1  G1 c, y 
t2 25 3500 G2  G1 b, w 
t3 25 4000 G3  G1 a, f 
t4 30 6500 G2  G2 b, f 
t5 35 4500 G1  G2 a, w 
t6 40 5500 G1  G2 c, y 
t7 45 6000 G2  G3 e, z 
t8 50 5000 G3  G3 d, z 
t9 55 6500 G3  G3 a, x 
Table 24 : Anonymized data of Xiao-Chun et al (MMDCF algorithm) 
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3.6 Ye et al Model 
Work by [69] proposes decomposition  model for MSA privacy preserving problem. 
Basically, it decomposes the dataset into SA-groups.  For example, Table 25 (ii) shows an 
anonymized data for (i) table. For each group of tuples, instead of generalizing QI attributes it 
composes or bucketizes the SA values. firstly, [69] model constructs tuples equivalence 
classes based on -diversity model and using one sensitive attribute each time. However this 
model can’t prevent membership attack, all tuples are released as it is without anonymization 
process. Additionally, it doesn’t provide a probabilistic model; therefore a tuple may be more 
likely to appear than other tuples within same equivalence class.    
 
 (QI) (SA)  (QI) (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code I1 I2  Age Zip code I1 I2 
Amy 30 1200 b w  30 1200 
b, c w, x 
Bob 20 2400 c x  20 2400 
Che 23 1500 a w  23 1500 
a, c w, y 
Dina 27 3400 c y  27 3400 
 i. Microdata   ii. Anonymized data 
Table 25 : Ye et al model example 
 
3.7 Fang et al Model 
Work by [70] provides a new model, CODIP, as a privacy preserving model for data 
with multiple sensitive attributes. CODIP projects the microdata on to SA groups, where each 
group satisfies t-closeness or any other anonymization algorithm. The anonymized data will 
be the projected data, where projected data isolates disjoint SA groups in separate tables. All 
tuples in the anonymized data will have a randomize order. However CODIP prevents 
intersection and minimality attacks it still doesn’t avoid attacks based on probability.  
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4. PRIVACY-PRESERVING FOR DYNAMIC RELEASES 
 
Recent research has been devoted to study the privacy preserving for multiple data 
publishing [28, 29, 44, 45, 57, 58, 61, 71, 72]. They refer to this kind of study as sequential 
releases [28, 29, 71], serial data publishing [44, 55], dynamic anonymization [58, 72] and 
multiple data releases depending on the difference between data releases. 
The dynamic data releases occur when data holder needs to publish new information 
for same data, another instance for same data or/and updated data. For example, data holder 
published data for an issue 1 (R1), another issue 2 needed to be published therefore dataset 
holder makes a new release (R2).   These releases may differ with quasi-identifier attributes 
/sensitive attributes or/and with period of time. The first release R1 released at timestamp1. 
The second release R2 will be released at timestamp2, and so on so forth, where timestamp1 
< timestamp2. Moreover, when anonymizing R2 we cannot modify R1; simply R1 becomes 
part of history. In public opinion polls privacy preserving area, polls may organize in a 
different periods of time. One may suggest accumulating all releases, and then anonymizing 
it together. The first public opinion issue will postponed until the second, third, or more ones 
are collected. This idea is a time consuming task. Its not be acceptable in public opinion 
problem.  
k-anonymity, -diversity, t-closeness, etc [3], [16], [17], [18], [19], have provided a 
number of valuable privacy-protecting techniques. However, they are only deal with one-time 
data release (static- release). This implies a significant limitation, as in many applications 
data have many releases which collected continuously.  
Simply using k-anonymity or other static-release approaches to anonymize the new 
releases independently without considering the previous releases may cause privacy 
violations. The relations between QI and SA in the releases data will give adversaries great 
opportunities to reveal individuals’ privacy. Illustrations of these threats will be present 
through some examples in the following sections.  
The key point is how to anonymize the current release so that it cannot be linked to 
previous releases, and still remains useful for its own release purpose. 
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Many types of dynamic data releases have been discussed, work by [73] discussed the 
sequential data releases when the sensitive attributes for new release doesn’t has any relation 
with the previous release. In [73] a global guarantee (across all releases) has been declared to 
give more accurate privacy measurement than the local guarantee (for each release). Work 
[71] studied the problem of releasing different attributes’ subsets for same microdata where 
Quasi-identifiers can be reconstructed from several releases. Work [58] defined a new model 
(m-invariance) for dynamic releases for same dataset with updated tuples. In [58] both 
insertions and deletions have been discussed. Both of [57] and [72] presented remedy models 
for m-invariance model. While [74] and [75] concerns only the insertion of new tuples. 
 
4.1 SAs Independent Approach 
 
-diversity ensures that the probability of mapping an individual to a sensitive value is 
bounded by 1/. Therefore, it guarantees that every equivalence class contains at least  
distinct SA values. Assuming there are no associations between issues SAs, which means that 
the first SA values are independent from the second SA values, and so on so forth.   
As an example, Table 26 shows two voters’ records where first issue SA doesn’t has 
any relation with second issue SA. The anonymization in Table 27 (i) satisfies 3-diversity on 
I1 and Table 27 (ii) satisfies 3-diversity on I2. Consider an adversary who has the background 
knowledge that Bob (t1) will vote for (a) on I1, thus the adversary can only exclude t1 tuple in 
the first group. Since there are no relations between the two SAs, the first group that includes 
t1 in Table 27 (ii) will not be affected. The adversary will not gain any new information and 
Table 27 will still satisfy 3-diversity on I1 and I2. 
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  (QI)  SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip  I1 
Bob(t1) 20 3000 a 
Ken(t2) 25 3500 b 
Peter(t3) 25 4000 d 
Sam(t4) 30 6500 a 
Jane(t5) 35 4500 b 
Linda(t6) 40 5500 a 
Alice(t7) 45 6000 c 
Mandy(t8) 50 5000 b 
Tom(t9) 55 6500 c 
 
  (QI) (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip  I2 
Bob(t1) 20 3000 w 
Ken(t2) 25 3500 z 
Peter(t3) 25 4000 x 
Sam(t4) 30 6500 x 
Jane(t5) 35 4500 y 
Linda(t6) 40 5500 y 
Alice(t7) 45 6000 z 
Mandy(t8) 50 5000 x 
Tom(t9) 55 6500 w 
i. First Issue T1 ii. Second Issue T2 
Table 26 : The microdata of two independent issues 
 
 (QI) (SA) 
TID Age Zip code R1 
     
t1 [20-25] [3000-4000] a 
t2 [20-25] [3000-4000] b 
t3 [20-25] [3000-4000] d 
     
t4 [30-45] [4500-6500] a 
t5 [30-45] [4500-6500] b 
t7 [30-45] [4500-6500] c 
     
t6 [40-55] [5000-6500] a 
t8 [40-55] [5000-6500] b 
t9 [40-55] [5000-6500] c 
 
 (QI) (SA) 
TID Age Zip code R2 
     
t1 [20-25] [3000-4000] w 
t2 [20-25] [3000-4000] z 
t3 [20-25] [3000-4000] x 
     
t4 [30-45] [4500-6500] x 
t5 [30-45] [4500-6500] y 
t7 [30-45] [4500-6500] z 
     
t6 [40-55] [5000-6500] y 
t8 [40-55] [5000-6500] x 
t9 [40-55] [5000-6500] w 
 
a) First Release R1  b) Second Release R2 
Table 27 : The anonymized data for two independent issues 
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The non-membership attack doesn’t work in the independent association case. Even if 
an adversary knows i bits of non-membership knowledge, he/she cannot link it with the next 
release SA.  
However, in real life there are partially or fully associations among sensitive 
attributes. For instance, public opinion polls like “Do you approve or disapprove of Barack 
Obama’s performance as president? ” have been published five times during 2011 [62]. In 
this case, there are five polls where SAs are fully associated. Another partially association 
may also happens. In dynamic data releases it’s not possible to deal with the SAs as one SA, 
simply when anonymizing the second release; it’s not possible to change the first release.  In 
the next section, techniques prepared to this type of sensitive values will present.  
 
4.2 SAs Dependent Approaches 
 
Correlations between sensitive attributes in sequentially released data may leads to 
serious disclosure scenarios. It may happen that one SA work as identifier to another SA. In 
public opinion polls, a poll question about head of a party performance and another question 
about the party performance have a high association.   The following sections will represent 
the prepared approaches and possible attacks for SAs associations. 
 
4.2.1 Record-linking Attack 
Data holder release new data as it’s available. Different releases perhaps for same 
dataset with different attributes which may yield to record-linking across multiple anonymous 
releases. For instance, first release may contain Age, Zip code and Issue1 attributes, second 
release may contain participant’s name, Age and Zip code attributes. An adversary can 
launch a record-linking attack by joining the identical set of attributes from the two releases. 
In Table 28, the adversary may join the first tuple in Table 28 (i) with second tuple in Table 
28 (ii) to conclude that Bob has voted by (a) for issue1.  
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 (QI) SA) 
Age Zip code I1 
25 3500 b 
20 3000 a 
40 5500 a 
45 6000 c 
 
 (QI) 
Name Age Zip code 
Bob 20 3000 
Ken 25 3500 
Linda 40 5500 
Alice 45 6000 
i. First release R1 ii. Second release R2 
Table 28 : The microdata for Join Attack example 
 
The work in [71] considers record-linking attack and provide a remedy for this type of 
dynamic releases definition. It presents the concept of (X, Y)-privacy as a top-down 
specialization approach to prevent record-linking attack.  
 
4.2.2 Value-association Attack 
 
Another definition for dynamic data release state that: the same data and same 
attributes may anonymize differently for different purposes. m-invariance model [58]  
supports dynamic data release in both new tuple insertions and deletions scenarios. Value-
association attack happens if an adversary knows that a certain participant appears in both 
releases. Table 29 and Table 30 depict an anonymized data with two releases, where R1 is the 
first release and R2 is the second release. An adversary may know that Bob participates in R1 
and R2 and his age is 20, then by looking to the association between the first group in R1 and 
R2, it is easy to deduce that he has (a) as SA value. The m-invariance model effectively limits 
the risk of privacy disclosure caused by this attack.  It guarantees that each anonymized group 
has at least m tuples, each with a unique set of sensitive values. In order to make these groups 
m-invariance may insert some counterfeit tuples. Due to the sensitive values’ consistency, a 
value-equivalence attack may be used to breach privacy; this attack will be presented in 
Section  4.2.4.  
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Name 
QI 
SA 
Age Zip 
Bob 25 3500 a 
Ken 20 3000 b 
Linda 40 5500 a 
Alice 45 6000 c 
 
QI 
SA 
Age Zip 
[20-30] [3000-4000] a 
[20-30] [3000-4000] b 
[40-50] [5000-6000] a 
[40-50] [5000-6000] c 
i. Microdata T1 ii. First release (R1) 
Table 29 : First Release for the Value-association Attack 
 
 
Name 
QI 
SA 
Age Zip 
Bob 25 3500 a 
Peter  23 4000 c 
Linda 40 5500 a 
Mandy 50 6000 b 
 
QI 
SA 
Age Zip 
[20-30] [3000-4000] a 
[20-30] [3000-4000] c 
[40-50] [5000-6000] a 
[40-50] [5000-6000] b 
i. Microdata T2 ii. Second release (R2) 
Table 30 : Second Release for the Value-association Attack 
 
4.2.3 Correspondence Attack 
In dynamic data release, even if released data met the anonymization requirement; an 
adversary may focus on the groups’ relation and correspondence between released data. 
Possible scenario as presented in Table 31 and Table 32: an adversary may know that Jane is 
in R1 and R2. Therefore in R1, Jane may has ‹a, a, b› as sensitive values, while in R2 she 
may has ‹b, b, a›. This allow adversary to eliminate t1 or t2, also to eliminate r3 or r4. As 
result Jane has probability ½ to has a (or b) as SA.  
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Without delaying tuples or inserting counterfeit tuples, [57] work presented an 
example of correspondence attack. In addition, it presents BCF-anonymity method as a new 
generalization method secured from correspondence attack. However, [57] work concerns 
only in the tuple insertion scenario. It doesn’t provide a solution for new releases with 
updated tuple.  
[61] Work mentioned a possible approach to anonymize only new tuples for new 
releases. In addition it also declared such approach will cause a low quality data. [61] work 
proposes incremental anonymization techniques for insertion scenario.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 32: An anonymized data for R2 in the Correspondence Attack 
 
 
TID 
QI 
SA 
Age Gender 
t1 35 * a 
t2 35 * a 
t3 35 * b 
Table 31 : An  anonymized data for R1 in the Correspondence Attack 
TID 
QI 
SA 
Age Gender 
r1 [20-40] M a 
r2 [20-40] M a 
r3 [20-40] F b 
r4 [20-40] F b 
r5 [20-40] F a 
r6 [20-40] M b 
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4.2.4 Value-equivalence Attack 
The m-invariance model [58] provides protection against value-association attack. It 
keeps the same sensitive values for each group while changes the QI tuples.  A serious 
privacy breach may appear if an adversary considers changes in QI tuples.  Table 33 
represents a microdata and anonymized data for first release R1 at time T1. Table 34 presents 
an updated microdata, where 3 tuples from Table 33 deleted and 4 new tuples added. Table 
34 (b) presents a 2-diversity anonymized data.  
If an adversary knows that Bob is in the first group in all releases R1 and R2, also 
knows that Ken voted by (b) then the adversary will reveal all votes for all participants in the 
first group. Furthermore if Bob is an adversary then he will reveal all other privacy this 
known as value-association attack.  
 
 
  (QI)  SA) 
TID Age Zip code I1 
Bob 20 3000 a 
Ken 25 3500 b 
Sam 30 6500 a 
Jane 35 4500 b 
Linda 40 5500 a 
Alice 45 6000 c 
(a) Microdata T1 
 
  (QI)  SA) 
TID Age Zip code I1 
Bob [20-25] [3000-3500] a 
Ken [20-25] [3000-3500] b 
Sam [30-35] [4500-6500] a 
Jane [30-35] [4500-6500] b 
Linda [40-45] [5500-6000] a 
Alice [40-45] [5500-6000] c 
 (b) Anonymized data at R1 
Table 33 : 2-diversity anonymization 
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  QI  SA 
TID Age Zip code I1 
Bob 20 3000 a 
Sam 30 6500 a 
Alice 45 6000 c 
Mandy 50 5000 b 
David 40 5000 a 
Tom 55 6500 c 
Carol 45 5000 a 
(a) Microdata T2 
 
  QI SA 
TID Age Zip code I1 
Bob [20-50] [3000-6000] a 
Alice [20-50] [3000-6000] c 
Sam [30-50] [5000-6500] a 
Mandy [30-50] [5000-6500] b 
David [40-60] [5000-6500] a 
Tom [40-60] [5000-6500] c 
Carol [40-60] [5000-6500] a 
 (b) Anonymized data at R2 
Table 34 : A naive 2-diversity anonymized data at R2 
 
 
The m-invariance model provides a solution in Table 35, m-invariance preserves same 
signature for the sensitive attribute values and uses a counterfeit tuples in order to keep it. In 
Table 35 (b) there are 4 groups, comparing the first group G1 with the same one in Table 33 
(b) it has the same sensitive values. In G2 there is no new tuple with sensitive value b, 
therefore a counterfeit value c1 has been used.  However if an adversary considers the 
changes in G1 for R1 and R2, He/she will notice from R1 that Bob and Ken voted by a and b, 
while from R2 Bob and Mandy voted by a and b, thus Kan and Mandy had same vote. This 
type of attack known as value-equivalence attack [72]. 
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  QI  SA 
TID Age Zip code I1 
Bob 20 3000 a 
Sam 30 6500 a 
Alice 45 6000 c 
Mandy 50 5000 b 
David 40 5000 a 
Tom 55 6500 c 
Carol 45 5000 a 
 
(c) Microdata T2 
 
  QI SA 
TID Age Zip code I1 
Bob [20-50] [3000-5000] a 
Mandy [20-50] [3000-5000] b 
Sam [30-40] [5000-6500] a 
c1 [30-40] [5000-6500] b 
Alice [40-50] [5000-6000] c 
David [40-50] [5000-6000] a 
Tom [40-60] [5000-6500] c 
Carol [40-60] [5000-6500] a 
 (d) Anonymized data at R2 
Table 35 : 2-invariance anonymized data at R2 
 
 He et al. model [72] presents value-equivalence attack. In addition it provides a graph-
based technique based on m-invariance model to protect sequential data releases against both 
value-association and value-equivalence attacks. Table 36 present three releases for 
microdata using He et al. model. It published same signatures in one bucket.  
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TID 
Bob 
 QI  SA 
[20-35] [3000-6500] a 
Ken [20-35] [3000-6500] b 
Sam [20-35] [3000-6500] a 
Jane [20-35] [3000-6500] b 
 
Linda [40-45] [5500-6000] a 
Alice [40-45] [5500-6000] c 
c1 [40-45] [5500-6000] a 
c2 [40-45] [5500-6000] c 
(a) Anonymized data at R1 
 
TID 
Bob 
 QI SA 
[20-50] [3000-5000] a 
Mandy [20-50] [3000-5000] b 
Sam [30-40] [5000-6500] a 
c3 [30-40] [5000-6500] b 
 
Alice [40-50] [5000-6000] c 
David [40-50] [5000-6000] a 
Tom [40-60] [5000-6500] c 
Carol [40-60] [5000-6500] a 
 (b) Anonymized data at R2 
 
TID QI SA 
Bob [20-50] [3000-5000] a 
Olga [20-50] [3000-5000] b 
Sam [30-40] [5000-6500] a 
Nic [30-40] [5000-6500] b 
 
Tom [40-50] [5000-6000] c 
Carol [40-50] [5000-6000] a 
c4 [40-60] [5000-6500] c 
c5 [40-60] [5000-6500] a 
(c) Anonymized data at R3 
 
Table 36 : 2-invariance, 2-value equivalence anonymized data 
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4.2.5 Tuple-equivalence Attack 
 
Table 36 represents an example of the most recent work in sequential releases 
problem. m-invariance [58] and He et al. [72] models provide solutions for value-association 
attack and value-equivalence attack respectively. The adversary scenario has been assumed 
that an adversary knows that a certain participant presents in two or more releases.  
Although these models successfully preserve data against for the known attacks 
discussed in  4.2, we observe that there is a new possible attack threatens the anonymized 
data; we call it Tuple-equivalence attack. An adversary may know that certain participants in 
a release will vote for same party. This background knowledge will breach privacy for 
participants in the following releases. For example, in Table 36 there are four tuples in the 
first group in each release, in R1 ‹Bob, Ken, Sam, Jane›, in R2 two tuples deleted and two 
new tuples added to become ‹Bob, Mandy, Sam, c3›, in R3 two tuples deleted and two new 
tuples added to become ‹Bob, Olga, Sam, Nic›. Let the adversary knows that ‹Ken, Jane› will 
vote by same SA value. Even if the adversary doesn’t know that they have voted by a or b, 
s/he can compare first group in R1, R2 and R3 and learns that ‹Mandy, c3› in R2 have voted 
by same value that ‹Ken, Jane› in R1 and ‹Olga, Nic› in R3 voted. Therefore the adversary 
will reveals all sensitive values if he/she knows only one sensitive value in any release. 
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4.3 ρ-different Approach 
The dynamic data releases occur when dataset holder needs to publish updated view 
for same dataset, also when dataset holder publishes dataset after certain time another dataset 
holder publishes an updated version for same or part of data participants. For example, 
dataset holder published data for an issue 1 (R1), another issue 2 needed to be published – by 
same dataset holder or other one- therefore dataset holder makes a new release (R2). These 
releases may differ with quasi-identifier attributes /sensitive attributes or/and with period of 
time. The first release R1 released at time stamped time1. The second release R2 will be 
released at time stamped time2, and so on so forth, where time1<time2. Some tuples 
appeared in R1 will be removed in R2 also new tuples will be added to R2.In addition some 
values in R1 will be updated and appear in R2. When anonymizing R2 we cannot modify R1.  
As mentioned in the introduction of chapter  4, recent researches on data 
anonymization focus on static datasets, which perform one-time release and did not support 
republication of updated data. In real datasets, there are many scenarios where dynamic 
datasets with multiple releases are published. For example, public opinions polling deal with 
multiple issues in a different timestamp. Hospitals may need to reveal data periodically to 
present the diseases changes for research purposes. An anonymization model must consider 
correlations between updated values. Many dynamic data studies consider only tuples 
insertion and deletion operations and did not offer value update operation (see section  4.2). 
Few works addressed the update operation but did not take in account the correlations 
between released data. To best of our knowledge there is no work consider the correlation 
between sensitive values.  
In this work, we identify the privacy problem regarding dynamic dataset publishing 
and propose a new probabilistic privacy model ρ-different, specifically defined on datasets 
with continually updated attributes’ values. We also present a heuristic anonymization 
technique to enforce p-different.  
An adversary may combine released datasets to breach participants’ privacy. He/she 
may compare or link tuples across released tables to identify a specific participant or to raise 
the likelihood for a certain participant with a certain sensitive value.  We illustrate these 
threats through the following example. 
A hospital periodically releases patient’s diagnosis data to public in order to allow 
medical researchers to find valuable data. Moreover, the hospital publishes the correlation 
information between all diseases such as the following:  
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P(Deafness | Rubella) 80% 
P(Deafness | Meningitis) 70% 
P(Migraine | Meniere) 50% 
P(Fever | Diarrhea) 70% 
P(Fever |Sore Throat)  50% 
P(Diarrhea| Gastrointestinal Infections)  50% 
P(Aids | Aids) 100% 
P(Cancer | Cancer) 100% 
Table 37 : Example of diseases correlations (C) 
 
P(Deafness | Rubella), 80%, which means that with 80% likelihood Rubella disease, 
will cause Deafness disease. P(Aids |Aids) with 100% likelihood means that Aids disease 
recognized as permanent diseases. 
In the following table there are two releases R1and R2 which represent anonymized 
version of dataset T1 and dataset T2 respectively. Ken’s tuple was deleted in the second 
dataset T2 and Frank’s tuple was inserted. The sensitive values for Bob and Linda were 
updated with new values. 
 
TID QI(Age) SA1 
Alice [20-45] Aids1 
Bob [20-45] Diarrhea 
Linda [20-45] GI 
Ken [20-45] Fever 
 
TID QI(Age) SA2 
Alice [20-45] Aids2 
Bob [20-45] Fever 
Linda [20-45] Diarrhea 
Frank [20-45] Cancer 
 
First release (R1) Second release (R2) 
Table 38 : Two datasets releases 
 
R1 represent one group with 4 sensitive values. An adversary can infer that the 
probability for each sensitive value in R1 is 0.25. However s/he may use the correlations 
between sensitive values as described in Table 37 to calculate the probability for each 
sensitive value in R2. For instance the probability that any participant in R2 got Aids
2
 is 
0.366. This can be calculated as follows: 
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 The correlation probability X  Y can be expressed as Conditional probability Pr(Y|X), 
where X is a sensitive value in the previous release R1 and the Y is a sensitive value in R2. 
The Joint probability for dependent values can be calculated using the following equation:   
Pr YX = 𝑃𝑟 𝑌 𝑋 . 𝑃(𝑋) 
While for independent values can be expressed as: 
Pr YX = Pr⁡(𝑌). 𝑃(𝑋) 
Then we need to calculate all combination of values in the two groups. It’s clear that the 
probabilities of inferring sensitive values in the new release have been affected by the 
correlations between these sensitive values. The probability of Aids disease rose. To protect 
participant’s privacy, we would like the probability of linking a sensitive attribute to a certain 
participant in one or more data releases to be at most ρ. 
We assume the following adversary model in the case of public opinions scenario: 
 The adversary has access to an external dataset P that contains EI and QI attributes.  
 The adversary may know R1, R2, and correlations (C) between sensitive values in R1 
and sensitive values in R2. 
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Italic letters: tuples will be removed in R2, underline letters: tuples will be in both releases   
Bold letters: tuple will be added in R2 
Consider a hospital that releases medical data for researchers’ project every six months. The 
hospital tried to preserve patients’ data. Table 39 depicts the microdata T1 and its first 
anonymized release R1. R1 guarantee 2-diversity therefore, an adversary cannot identify any 
patient with probability more than ½.  Table 39 (iii) represents the correlations between 
sensitive values from R1 and R2, where g(R1)g(R2) 100% means that 100% likelihood 
that g(R2) occurs knowing that g(R1) has occurred. 
 QI  SA 
ID Age Zip I1 
t1 21 12k d 
t2 22 14k b 
t3 24 18k f 
t4 23 25k g 
t5 41 20k f 
t6 36 27k g 
t7 37 33k d 
t8 40 35k f 
t9 43 26k g 
t10 52 33k d 
t11 56 34k g 
 
  QI  SA 
ID GID Age Zip I1 
t1 1 [21-22] [12k, 14k] d 
t2 1 [21-22] [12k, 14k] b 
t3 2 [23-24] [18k, 25k] f 
t4 2 [23-24] [18k, 25k] g 
t5 3 [36-41] [20k, 27k] f 
t6 3 [36-41] [20k, 27k] g 
t7 4 [37-43] [26k, 35k] d 
t8 4 [37-43] [26k, 35k] f 
t9 4 [37-43] [26k, 35k] g 
t10 5 [52-56] [33k, 34k] d 
t11 5 [52-56] [33k, 34k] c 
 
 
         P(g| g) 100% 
 
         P(d| d) 50% 
 
         P(c| c) 100% 
 
         P(m| m) 50% 
i. Microdata (T1) ii. First Release (R1) iii. Sensitive values 
correlations (C) 
Table 39 : 2-diversity anonymized data at R1 
 
The microdata at second released has been updated as follows, all underlined IDs 
‹t1,t4,t5,t7,t9 and t11› will stay in R2, while all italicized IDs ‹t2,t3,t6,t8 and t10› will be 
deleted in R2, moreover tuples ‹n1, n2, n3, n4 and n5› with bold letters and start with n 
character will be added to R2.  
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 QI  SA 
ID Age Zip I2 
t1 21 12k d 
t4 23 25k g 
n1 25 21k f 
t7 37 33k d 
t9 43 26k g 
t5 41 20k f 
n2 46 30k g 
n3 54 31k d 
t11 56 34k g 
n4 60 44k g 
n5 65 36k f 
 
  QI  SA  Pr 
ID GID Age Zip I2  % 
t1 1 [21-22] [12k-14k] d  50 
c1 1 [21-22] [12k-14k] b  50 
n1 2 [23-25] [21k-25k] f  25 
t4 2 [23-25] [21k-25k] g  75 
t7 3 [37-43] [26k-33k] d  27 
c2 3 [37-43] [26k-33k] f  20 
t9 3 [37-43] [26k-33k] g  53 
t5 4 [41-56] [31k-34k] f  25 
n2 4 [41-56] [31k-34k] g  75 
n3 5 [54-56] [31k-34k] d  25 
t11 5 [54-56] [31k-34k] c  75 
n4 6 [60-65] [36k-44k] g  50 
n5 6 [60-65] [36k-44k] f  50 
 
i. Microdata  (T2) ii. Second Release (R2) (2-invariance) 
Table 40 : 2-invariance anonymized data at R2 
 
Table 40 depicts 2-invariance anonymization for T2. It keeps same signature for the 
sensitive values. For that it uses a counterfeit tuples in order to keep it. EC1
1 is the first 
Equivalence Class in R1 which has t1 and t2 tuples with d and b as sensitive values.  EC2
1 is 
the first Equivalence Class in R2 which has t1 and c1 tuple with d and b as sensitive values. 
Therefore for eachECj
i, the j value represent the release number and the i value represent the 
equivalence class number within each release. 
  However the requirement of m-invariance model met in Table 40 (ii), it still violate 
patients privacy. The last column of Table 40 (Pr) represents the probability of each sensitive 
value based on the correlations between sensitive values. It shows that in EC2
2, EC2
3, EC2
4 and 
EC2
5 the calculated probabilities are more than the allowed one 50%. Therefore an adversary 
can identify that t4 in EC2
2 has g disease with probability 75%. 
The update operation and the correlations between sensitive values allow the 
adversary to enhance his likelihood to identify a certain participants. Furthermore, it shows 
the in effectiveness of existing solutions in privacy preserving.   
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Definition 1: We say a released table T* is ρ-different if for all individual P(individual has 
any specific sensitive value| F, C) < p where F is the frequency(priori belief) and C is the 
correlation information(likelihood).  
Table 41 depicts ρ-different approach, which considers tuples’ deletion and insertion 
operations as well as value update operation. What's more, ρ-different considers the full range 
of correlations between sensitive values. In Table 41 each group constructed based on the 
conditional probabilities caused from previous release. For instance EC2
2 has two tuples t4 
and c1 with two sensitive values g and c based on the correlations between sensitive values 
we have P(g| g) = 100% and P(c| c) = 100%. The probabilities for sensitive values in this 
group will be 50% which met the ρ-different requirement. The adversary will not be able to 
identify any participant with probability more than 50%. 
  QI SA  Pr 
ID GID Age Zip I2  % 
t1 1 [21-25] [12k-25k] d  50 
n1 1 [21-25] [12k-25k] f  50 
c1 2 [23-24] [21k-22k] c  50 
t4 2 [23-24] [21k-22k] g  50 
t7 3 [37-38] [33k-34k] d  50 
c3 3 [37-38] [33k-34k] m  50 
c2 4 [43-44] [26k-27k] c  50 
t9 4 [43-44] [26k-27k] g  50 
t5 5 [41-56] [31k-34k] f  50 
n3 5 [54-56] [31k-34k] d  50 
n2 6 [41-56] [31k-34k] g  50 
t11 6 [54-56] [31k-34k] c  50 
n4 7 [60-65] [36k-44k] g  50 
n5 7 [60-65] [36k-44k] f  50 
 
i. Second Release (R2) (2-different) 
Table 41 : 2-different anonymized data at R2 
 
Hilbert curve (see  5.5.1) allow us to map Quasi-identifiers attributes to one dimension.  
Figure 5 represent the mapping to T1 and T2 datasets. Hilbert curve preserves the data points’ 
locality, which allows us to join closed tuples together.  
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5. MSA DIVERSITY ALGORITHM 
5.1 Adversary Model and Privacy Standard 
We assume that the private data is in the form of a table T (see Table 4). Each tuple in 
T is related to an individual and the table contains a set of attributes called quasi-identifiers 
(QI) and another set of attributes called sensitive attributes. QI attributes are attributes that, 
when used together, can be used to identify individual users. SA attributes contain 
individual’s opinions in our case.  
We also assume there is no unique identifiers (UI) in T such as SSN, name. We assume 
the following adversary model in the case of public opinions scenario: 
1) The adversary has access to an external dataset P (see Table 3) that contains UI and 
QI attributes. 
2) The adversary may know non-membership knowledge on some individuals. 
Non-membership knowledge is defined as follows:  
Definition 2: (non-membership information) For a group G of individuals, we say an 
adversary has one bit of non-membership information if the adversary knows that an 
individual u in G does not vote for opinion o on some issue i for exactly one u, o, and i. The 
adversary can have many bits of non-membership information on the same individual or on 
up to i different individuals. 
Our adversary model is realistic for public opinion datasets for the following reasons: 
It has been shown in [13] that the external tables as in table P are available in the form of 
public datasets (such as voters datasets in US). Besides, the QI information for a specific 
individual can easily be known by an adversary that has close relations with the individual 
(such as friends and family). The non-membership information mentioned in  1.1 can be 
gained from two sources. As the public opinion datasets are open to public, the adversary 
herself might be one of the voters or might collude with some other voters to learn their 
opinions. As we shall see shortly, due to the nature of anonymization, this creates non-
membership knowledge on some groups of people. The non-membership information might 
also come from close relationships. Note that, given only background knowledge, the data 
holder cannot release T as it is even though T does not contain any UI attributes. Otherwise, 
an adversary knowing P and seeing T, can join the two tables to discover that , say Bob, votes 
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for a and w on issues I1 and I2. Thus, the released data has to ensure that such disclosure is 
limited probabilistically. The following definition highlights one of our privacy requirements:  
Definition 3: (-pdiversity) We say a released table T* is -pdiverse if and only if given T* 
and P, the probability that any individual t in T can be mapped to any opinion o on any issue i 
is bounded by 1/. The following definition makes it easy to check if a given anonymization 
is -pdiversity.  
Definition 4: (Equivalence Class) The set of all tuples in a table T* containing identical 
values of QI.  
For example, in Table 42, t1, t2, and t3 form an equivalence class as they have the same age 
and zip code. Similarly, t6, t8, and t9 form another equivalence class. 
 (QI) (SA) 
Tuple ID Age Zip code I1 I2 
     
t1 [20-25] [3000-4000] a w 
t2 [20-25] [3000-4000] b z 
t3 [20-25] [3000-4000] d x 
     
t6 [40-55] [5000-6500] a y 
t8 [40-55] [5000-6500] b x 
t9 [40-55] [5000-6500] c w 
     
t4 [30-45] [4500-6500] a x 
t5 [30-45] [4500-6500] b y 
t7 [30-45] [4500-6500] c z 
Table 42 : MSA-diversity released data 𝐓𝟐
∗  
 
Theorem 1: An anonymization T* of T is -pdiversity if and only if for every equivalence set 
in T* and for every issue; 
the  number  of  the  most  frequent  opinion
the  size  of  the  equivelance  class  
<
1

 .  
Note that in Table 42, T2
∗ is 3-pdiverse anonymization of T given P. For example, an 
adversary knowing that Linda (t6) is in the anonymization can map Linda to the second 
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equivalence class. The probability that Linda votes for any opinion on any issue is bounded 
by 1/3. In Table 22, T1
∗ is 2-pdiverse; the probability that Linda votes for c is 1/2. 
We now formally define MSA-diversity for non-membership attacks: 
Definition 5: (MSA-diversity) We say a released table T* is -mdiverse if and only if T* is 
(-i)-pdiverse under i bits of non-membership knowledge for i >= 0. 
Surely, MSA diversity is a harder problem, especially when one faces multiple issues 
in the dataset. As an example, in Table 2; even if the dataset is 3-pdiverse, it violates 3-
mdiversity. If the adversary knows that Amy does not vote for c for issue 1, the 
anonymization would still satisfy 2-pdiversity with respect to the same issue. However, the 
anonymization would violate 2-pdiversity with respect to issue 2. On the other hand, in Table 
42, Table T2
∗ is 3-mdiverse anonymization of T. Even if the adversary knows that Linda does 
not vote for c, the probability that she votes for any opinion on any issue is still bounded by 
1/2. 
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Figure 6 : 3-diversity groups using our model 
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As an example, consider Table 4 and Table 42 . Figure 6 shows a 2D representation of 
table T, where the x-dimension is Zipcode And y-dimension is Age and tuples are placed 
according to their Age and zip-codes. As we shall see in chapter  5, our approach creates the 
anonymization T2
∗ . In Figure 6, dashed rectangles represent the grouping in T2
∗. The groups 
are enclosed by three rectangles and the corresponding anonymization is more utilized with 
respect to the metrics mentioned in chapter  2.6. 
5.2 Problem Formulation 
Given a private table T with quasi-identifiers and sensitive issues, and a privacy 
parameter , find an anonymization T* of T, such that  
 T* is -mdiverse with respect to the adversary given in this section. 
 T* minimizes the information cost metric. 
5.3 Data preprocessing 
Data preprocessing is an important step to the dataset to make it more suitable for data 
mining and getting more efficient results. Datasets may be noisy, incomplete, and 
inconsistent due to their huge size. Bad or low data quality will lead to poor results.  Many 
data preprocessing techniques can be used like: data cleaning, data transformation, attribute 
construction, data reduction, data discretization and/or data linkage. In our experiments we 
have used data cleaning to remove noisy data specially outliers tuples and data reduction to 
reduce the data size. 
5.4 Checking for MSA Diversity 
Checking if a given group of tuples (e.g., equivalence class) satisfies MSA Diversity 
is a sub-problem in our algorithm. Unfortunately, checking an arbitrary group for MSA 
diversity is not a trivial task. Instead, we aim to create a subfamily of groups that are proven 
to be MSA diverse. Such groups satisfy the ’SA-distinct’ property which is defined as 
follows:  
Definition 6: (SA-distinct Group) A given group of tuples G is SA-distinct group if and only 
if for any pair of tuples t1  G and t2  G and for any issue i, t1[i] ≠ t2[i]. For a given group 
of tuples, assuming we have two issues i1 and i2, one can plot the distribution of sensitive 
opinions in a group G over a matrix. The dimension i of the matrix represents the issue i. Any 
tuple t  G is drawn on the matrix index (q, r) if t[i1] = q and t[i2] = r. The group G is SA-
distinct if every row and column of the matrix contains at most one tuple. As an example, in 
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Figure 10(a), we place the first three tuples t1, t2, and t3 on the matrix. This group is SA-
distinct as no row or column contains more than one tuple. However the group t5, t6, t8 and 
t9 is not SA-distinct as can be seen in Figure 10(b). 
 
Theorem 2: SA-distinct group of at least  elements satisfies -mdiversity.  
 
5.5 Generalization Algorithm 
We now propose an efficient heuristic algorithm for the MSA diversity problem. Our 
algorithm has two phases:  
 Dataset grouping: T is partitioned into a set of disjoint groups such that each group is 
SA-distinct, thus -mdiverse. 
 Generalization: The groups are generalized or anatomized. 
 
Figure 7 : Hilbert curve mapping 
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5.5.1 Mapping multi-dimensional QI to one-dimension 
MSA- diversity model works in a top-down manner. QI attributes needed to be 
arranged in a way that similar tuples with respect to QI stay closed to each other. 
Constructing equivalence classes from similar QI and diverse SA will produce a high-quality 
released data. 
QI have many attributes therefore a mechanism needed to map multidimensional 
attributes to one dimension, moreover this mechanism should preserving locality of the data 
points. Let represent tuples as data points in a 2D space (for Example Figure 7). One way of 
mapping the multi-dimensional QI to one-dimension is space-filling curve. It works like a 
single path passes over all data points (tuples).  Many types of space-filling curves have been 
discussed in literature. The main diffidence between it is the way of representing the one-
dimension space. Figure 8 shows three different kinds of space-filling curves. 
  
 
(a) Peano curve[76] (b) Z-order curve[77] (c) Sierpinski curve[78] 
Figure 8 : Different types of space-filling curves 
 
The Peano curve is the first space-filling curve technique [76].The mapping is based 
on the ternary subdivision. Its structure is shown in Figure 8(a) The Z-order curve technique 
[77] maps quadrants recursively. The resulting order is similar to results from depth-first 
traversal of a quad-tree.  Therefore the Z-ordering can be used to construct high dimensional 
data structures. Its structure is shown in Figure 8(b). The Sierpinski curve is based on a 
triangular subdivision. Its geometric construction is shown in Figure 8(c). The Hilbert curve 
is a space filling curve that visits every data point in a square grid. It makes better use of the 
harmony of neighboring data points. [79] and [80] show that Hilbert curve outperforms other 
techniques by minimizing the number of clusters for 2×2 range queries. It provides the 
minimum number of clusters. Moreover it preserves the data points’ locality. Therefore we 
deployed Hilbert curve in our work.  
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The pseudo code for our heuristic algorithm is given in Figure 13. The algorithm 
accepts two parameters: the microdata T and the privacy parameter , obtains QI groups for 
publication. The algorithm first maps the multi-dimensional QI attributes to a single 
dimension using Hilbert space filling curve as shown in Figure 7, and sorts the records 
according to their QI value as shown in Table 43 (lines 1-3). Then in each iteration, the 
algorithm constructs SA-distinct groups of at least  tuples heuristically. Starting with the 
first  tuples; it checks if it’s possible to construct an SA-distinct group. If it’s possible; 
proceeds to the next QI group. Else if there are extra tuples which cannot be added to any 
group, the algorithm borrows some tuples from the next tuple in order to construct a new 
partition. The remaining ungrouped tuples are grouped together.  
 (QI) (SA) 
Tuple ID 1D (I1) (I2) 
t1 1 a w 
t2 3 b z 
t3 8 d x 
t5 11 b y 
t6 34 a y 
t8 37 b x 
t9 43 c w 
t7 46 c z 
t4 50 a x 
 
Table 43 : Microdata with one dimension QI 
 
From Table 43 we have two issues (I1 and I2) and for each issue there are 4 distinct 
opinions. Figure 9 depicts the 3D scatter plot for Table 43. For the first three tuples, we can 
easily construct a SA-distinct group which by definition 2 satisfies 3-mdiversity. This can be 
seen from the matrix in Figure 10(a), as t1, t2 and t3 are in different rows and columns, thus 
G1= ‹t1, t2, t3› becomes the first group. As shown in Figure 10(b) for t5, t6, and t8; we can’t 
construct a SA-distinct group as t5[I2] = t6[I2] therefore we remove t5 and borrow t9 in order 
to construct another SA-distinct group G2= ‹t6, t8, t9›. Moreover, t5 still does not belong to 
any group. By grouping the remaining tuples we construct the last SA-distinct group as G3= 
‹t5, t7, t4›. The three resulting groups G1, G2, and G3. 
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Figure 9 : 3D scatter plot for Table 43 
 
 
Figure 10 : Groups construction process 
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Figure 10 represents the groups’ construction process. To construct an equivalence 
class which respect -pdiversity, we need to represent the SA values in a matrix like Figure 
10(a). Next MSA-diversity algorithm checks the -pdiversity condition.  
A permutation matrix is a square binary matrix. It has a property that all its entries are 
0’s and 1’s, where each row and each column has a single 1.  
 
1 0 0  1 0 0  0 1 0 
0 1 0  0 0 1  1 0 0 
0 0 1  0 1 0  0 0 1 
           
0 1 0  0 0 1  0 0 1 
0 0 1  1 0 0  0 1 0 
1 0 0  0 1 0  1 0 0 
Figure 11 : Permutation matrices for 3 elements 
 
Figure 11 depicts 6 different matrices for 3 elements. The number of permutations matrices 
of n distinct elements is equals the n factorial. Therefore in Figure 11 example there are six 
different matrices. 
*   
 *  
  * 
Figure 12 : One matrix of Costas arrays for 3 elements 
 
Costas array [81-83] is a special permutation matrix. For n elements it can constructs 
n! matrices having same property of permutation matrix. Costas arrays arise in sonar, radar 
and cryptography applications. In our model, we have a set of sensitive attribute values and 
each row/column represent a distinct SA value. The key question is to find maximum number 
of Costas arrays.  
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As shown in dataset of Table 4 and its generalization data in Table 42, there are 3 different 
groups have been constructed heuristically based on the general idea of Costas array. Figure 
10 depicts the construction process.   
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5.5.2 The MSA-diversity Heuristic Algorithm 
Algorithm 1 Heuristic algorithm 
Require: microdata T, value of   ; 
Ensure: output T* satisfies probabilistic -m diversity. 
1: Map the MD QI to 1D using Hilbert space filling curve 
2: Sort the records according to their 1D QI value 
3: P = empty set, F = empty set 
 
Traverse( 
4: for ( i=0, i<k, i++ ) {  /* where k is the number of distinct QI values */ 
5:      Gi = QIi tuples 
6:       j = 0 
7: Group: 
8:      Grouping(Gi, Pi, , j) 
9:      if ( |Fij| = 0) {  /* no groups in Pi */ 
10:          Gi= Gi + Gi+1   /*merge the current QI values with the next one */ 
11:          i = i +1 
12:         Go to Group 
13:      } 
14:  } 
 
Grouping(G, P, , j ) 
15: while (!Satisfy(P, ) and |G| > 0) { 
16:   maxitems(x): Select value x which has max number of items in its row (r) and column 
(c). 
17:    G’=G\‹r,c› 
18:    Add x to P 
19:    Grouping(G’, P, , i ) 
20: }  
21: if (Satisfy(P, )) { 
22:    Fij = P /* to save the final groups for each QI*/ 
23:    j =  j+1 
24:   G= G\P 
25:   P = Ø 
26: if (Satisfy(G, )){ 
27:       Grouping(G, P, , i ) 
28:       } 
29: } 
 
Satisfy(P, ) 
30: if  |P| ≥  
31:     return true 
32: else 
33:    return false 
Figure 13 : Pseudo code for our heuristic algorithm 
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6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this chapter, we compare our model with the existing state-of-the-art. The 
Algorithm is implemented in C# and the experiments were run on a Dell 2.4GHz machine 
with 2GB of memory, running windows 7.  
We used MovieLens dataset obtained from the GroupLens research lab1. It contains 
10000054 ratings applied to 10681 movies by 71567 users. Ratings for each movie vary from 
1 to 7. We used three quasi-identifier attributes Age, Gender and Zip code.  We picked seven 
movies from the dataset that are the most frequently rated among all movies. We marked the 
movie ratings as sensitive (movies can be thought as issues and actual ratings as opinions). In 
our experiment we chose a sub set contains users will 7 ratings for all of them, therefore our 
data set become 684 users. We used mainly discernibility metric (DM), loss metric (LM) and 
average relative error (AvRE) as information loss metric. We evaluate data accuracy using 
aggregate query answering as follows. First, we compute the corresponding generalized 
groups [24, 58, 84]. Second, we process a workload of 684 queries one query for each tuple- 
on the resulting tables. The effectiveness of generalization is computed by the average 
relative error. 
 
 
Figure 14 : LM, Information loss with varying  and d 
                                                 
1 URL: http://www.grouplens.org  
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Figure 15 : DM, Information loss with varying  and d 
 
6.1 Utility - varying  and d 
Figure 14 depicts the LM for various  and d (number of ratings). Recall that a 0 value 
of LM means no information loss. Figure 15 reports DM. As can be seen from the figures, an 
increase in the privacy parameter  results in more information loss due to the privacy/utility 
tradeoff. Similarly higher numbers of ratings have similar effect due to curse of 
dimensionality. Compared to the parameter d, utility is more sensitive to the changes in . For 
very small and very large , the number of ratings has little effect of the utility. 
6.2 Comparison with Previous Work 
We now compare our approach with the state-of-the-art anonymization algorithm for 
multiple sensitive attributes by Gal’s et al. For Gal’s et al model, we assume k=. We would 
like to emphasize that in terms of probability of disclosure, the -diversity definition adapted 
by Gal et al is weaker than -mdiversity proposed in  4.2.5. At the same privacy level  and no 
non-membership information, -diversity by Gal et al ensures the number of distinct sensitive 
values should be smaller than , thus does not guarantee a bound on the probability of 
disclosure. -mdiversity, on the other hand, bounds the probability by 1/. Moreover, MSA 
diversity algorithm ensures both privacy metrics. Thus, in our domain, MSA-diversity 
algorithm offers higher levels of privacy for all . We experimentally demonstrate 
probabilities of disclosure for both algorithms in Section  6.2.3. 
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Figure 16 : DM comparison, varying  and d=2 
 
 
Figure 17 : Query accuracy with varying  and d=2 
 
6.2.1 Utility comparison - varying  
For d=2 and d=5, we depict utility metric results in Figure 16and Figure 17. Query 
accuracy results given in Figure 18 and Figure 19 show a similar behavior. For low  values 
(which we believe to be the most practical privacy parameters as utility drops fast with high  
values), MSA-diversity method results in less information loss. As mentioned in  retpahC5, 
Hilbert curve-based generalizations are more flexible than partition-based approaches and can 
achieve higher levels of utility. The reason why we do not have the same relative 
performance for larger  is because the -diversity definition adapted by Gal et al is less 
restrictive. 
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Figure 18 : DM comparison, varying  and d=5 
 
 
Figure 19 : Query accuracy with varying  and d=5 
 
6.2.2 Utility comparison - varying d 
Figure 20 and Figure 21 depict the utility comparison of two approaches. As also 
shown earlier, The MSA-diversity algorithm, when compared to Gal et al, creates better 
utilized anonymizations for  = 2 but performs worse for  = 5. We also observe that the 
utility performance of both algorithms is not very sensitive to the number of sensitive 
attributes. Figure 22 and Figure 23 showing query accuracy results support these results. 
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Figure 20 : DM, varying number of sensitive attributes and =2 
 
 
Figure 21 : Query accuracy with varying number of sensitive attributes and  = 2 
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Figure 22 : DM, varying number of sensitive attributes and  = 5 
 
 
Figure 23 : Query accuracy with varying number of sensitive attributes and  = 5 
 
6.2.3 Probability of disclosure comparison 
As mentioned earlier, work by Gal et al does not guarantee a bound on the probability 
of disclosure (e.g., the probability that an individual will be associated with an opinion). 
Figure 24 and Figure 25 show the disclosure probabilities for all tuples after applying MSA-
diversity model and Gal’s et al model, where the x-dimension represents the probability of 
disclosure and y-dimension represent the number of tuples. Figure 24 depicts the results for d 
= 2 and  = 5. MSA-diversity algorithm ensures a maximum of 0.2 probability for all non-
suppressed tuples, while Gal’s et al anonymization algorithm results in disclosures with 
probabilities that can be as high as 0.6. Similarly, in Figure 25, we show disclosure 
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probabilities for d = 5 and  = 2. The MSA-diversity algorithm ensures a maximum of 0.5 
probability for all non-suppressed tuples. However Gals et al algorithm results in disclosures 
with probabilities that can be as high as 0.86. This clearly shows that MSA-diversity 
algorithm achieving -mdiversity, provides better privacy by protecting sensitive information 
against probabilistic adversaries. 
 
 
Figure 24 : Probability of disclosure for each tuple, d=2 and  = 5 
 
 
Figure 25 : Probability of disclosure for each tuple, d=5 and =2 
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7. CONCLUSIONS  
In this thesis, new anonymization models are proposed. ρ-different is a probabilistic 
model for dynamic release data. MSA-privacy is a probabilistic definition for releasing data 
with multiple sensitive attributes. It’s an alternative model that allows accurate 
anonymization. Most well known anonymization models are designed for data with single 
sensitive attributes; these models are not applicable for data with multiple sensitive attributes. 
Adversaries can use a new attack like non-membership attack to breach individual privacy.  
Some of recent research concerns this type of attacks and provides a remedy for it. However 
they are fallen in other types of attacks such as membership attack and probabilistic attack.  
ρ-different preserve privacy for dynamic data with insertion, deletion and update 
operations. What’s more it considers all correlations between sensitive values.  
The important advantage of the MSA-diversity model is the simplicity of deploying 
the algorithm. Data holder needs only to feeds the algorithm with the data set and the privacy 
level ( value). 
ρ-different and MSA-diversity models are applicable to publish anonymized tabular 
data for any other domain. Public opinion polls problem is an example.   
For future work, ρ-different and MSA-diversity may used to solve sequential data 
release problem with multiple sensitive attributes. Where a released data has been published 
and data holder needs to publish another modified copy.  
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
T Table 
G Group 
o Opinion 
MSA Multiple Sensitive Attributes 
SSA Single Sensitive Attribute 
PPDP Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing 
QI Quasi-Identifiers 
EU Explicit Identifiers 
EC Equivalence Class 
UI Unique Identifiers 
DM Discernibility Metric 
LM Information Loss Metric 
 AvRE Average Relative Error 
EMD Earth Mover’s Distance 
CODIP Complete Disjoint Projections 
PAC Political Action Committees 
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